The available intelligence at this point suggested strongly that the Cubans intended to advance southwards. Whether they would be content with pushing the South Africans away from Calueque and across the river by advancing ever nearer, or whether they intended to attack them, was far from clear- Castro was badly in need of something that could be represented as a victory and had been making some very aggressive noises.

Considering the situation and the considerable disparity between his force and that opposite him. Delport decided on an artillery strike to disrupt the Cuban force before it could move out to attack. He also decided to deploy 61 Mech across the Cunene to deal with any Cuban force that might attempt to attack the guns. While he wailed for his plan to be approved, he ordered 25 Field Squadron to build earth ramps up tu the heavy vehicle bridge at Calueque. which had never been completed. This would enable him to send 61 Mech over the river there rather than at Ruacana. where any crossing would be expectcd to take place. The ramps were built at night and camouflaged during the day.

On 24 June. meanwhile, a combined Cuban and Fapla force moved out of Xangongo to reoccupy Cuamato. They clashed with a South African screening force north of Cuamalo. This force, a company of 201 Battalion reinforced with a platoon from 8 SAI, two troops of Ratcl-90s and an 8Imm mortar section, was no match for tanks and soon broke contact and withdrew, not before losing two Buffels. Their brief resistance served its purpose, however, and the Cuban Fapla force did not continue to Cuamalo. Reorganised, the 201 Battalion force deployed at Cuamalo on 25 June to guard against reoceupation by Fapla.

Once the operation had been approved. 26 June was chosen as D-Day.

32 Battalion meanwhile organised platoon-strength and smaller protection forces for the forward observation officers who would control the fire. They were then inserted and infiltrated to the selected observation posts. Major Pierre Franken moved with Team 2 to a position near Tcchipa. from where he could bring fire on to the Cuban headquarters.

Major Hannes Nortmann had been called back from the Dala River with his missile-armed Ratels to refit at Rundu. On 25 June he was ordered lo be at Ruacana with his missile troop by 12h00 on 26 June. He set off with four missile - ZT-3 - Ratels. a command Ratel and a single Ratel-90 to replace the command vehicle if it were 'acquired' by the battalion headquarters.

At Ruacana Nortmann was given a five-minute briefing by the intelligence officer and spent five minutes with Colonel Delport. Then he set off to catch up with 61 Mech. which had deployed about thirty kilometres from Techipa to ambush any Cuban force that might move out to attack the guns when they began firing. At the front he lost his command Ratel, as he had expected, and took command of a combat team comprising his four missile Ratels. eight Ratel-90s of the 61 Mech anti-tank platoon and twelve Ratel-81s.

He deployed his force on the right of the road to Techipa. while the tank squadron and a mechanised infantry company deployed on the left of the road. They were in position by 18h00,

About last light on 26 June. Jan Hougaard and a small party on a koppie north of Calueque sent up several meteorological balloons to which they had tied chaff About 20h00 the Cuban air defence system began to react, launching six SA-6s at the balloons. The launches were watched and plotted by the artillery observers.

The artillery then fired their strike, hitting selected targets over a period of about four hours. The first salvo destroyed the Cuban artillery command post in Techipa, so the guns were left in peace to carry out their shoot without counter-bombardment to bother them. Only one Cuban battery reacted at all, firing some ten rounds before falling silent- There was no further reaction from Techipa.

The guns packed up and pulled out. They were followed soon after by 61 Mech. who wanted to be under cover against air observation before first light and pulled back about 22h00. Satisfied with the artillery strike, the South Africans were disappointed that there had been no response by the Cuban armour. Destroying some of it in the ambush would have done much to dissuade them from any operation against Calueque or Ruacana.

There was, in fact, some reaction. East of Techipa Lieutenant T.T. Abrieu was being chased by tanks and mechanised infantry that had found him. With the Cubans hot on his heels, he found that he could not establish communications, so all he could do was run. After some time he had gained enough ground to give his radio another try. Establishing contact with Hougaard, he told him of his predicament. Hougaard told him to plot his position and stand by to direct fire. Once he had the position, the G-5 battery fired a ranging round. It was accurate, so 'TT’ merely asked them to "search and sweep" while his patrol disengaged and made good its escape.

Early on 27 June Nortmann's force joined up with the mechanised infantry company commanded by Major Andre Vermeulen, who took command of the combined force. They moved up to their position of the previous night. Nortmann then suggested that they should deploy into combat formation and move farther north to deploy in a better anti-tank position.

Nortmann deployed a troop of Ratel-90s to either side of him and the four missile Ratels to his rear. He then advanced northwards on one side of the road to Techipa. The twelve Ratel-20s of the mechanised infantry followed behind them. The Ratcl-81s moved by bounds to be able to provide support when needed. The tank squadron again moved up on the other side of the road, but fell about twenty minutes behind.

About 08h50 elements of the combat team reported that they were being shadowed by several tanks.

About 09h00 Nortmann's force reached the second crest-line on its path, about thirty-five kilometres from Calueque. He stopped just short of the crest, climbed out and stood on his turret to scan ahead of his force. Seeing nothing, he continued the advance, as he had still not found a position he liked. As they entered the bush in the valley below the crest, a Ratcl-90 on his right was hit by an RPG-7 fired from twenty-five metres to its right. The Ratel was badly damaged by internal explosions and could not be recovered in the middle of a developing covering force action, so it was quickly blown up.

At 09h12 G-5s began shelling the advancing tanks. The forces in contact continued to exchange heavy fire. Another Ratel-90 was now hit and badly damaged, this one by a 100 mm projectile fired by a tank. The troop leader. Lieutenant Mciring. was killed and three members of his crew were wounded. This Ratel-90 was also blown up to prevent its capture.

Hannes Nortmann had shot out a tank and then found himself fully engaged dealing with infantry and RPG teams that had come too near for comfort, using his turret-top machine-gun to keep them away. He was hit in the neck and hand during the fighting. The other Ratel-90s of the anti-lank platoon also engaged the infantry, tanks and other vehicles that had appeared, using fire and manoeuvre to hit the enemy without exposing their thin-skinned Raids to the fire of the tanks. They shot out a BTR-60 and some trucks and caused heavy casualties among the dismounted infantry with co-axial and turret-top machine-guns and 90 mm cannistcr rounds.

After some minutes of intense fighting, the enemy broke contact and began to withdraw. The crews of the two Ratels that had been hit were picked up by the other Ratel-90s. They then pulled back a little to be clear of the bush and any infantry still lurking in it with RPGs. which were very dangerous to them at the close ranges imposed by the bush- Major Vermeulen had meanwhile in any case ordered the Ratels to pull back out of range of the opposing tanks. Nortmann, who had been wounded in the neck and hand. was the last to withdraw, having fought on on his own for a while as the rest of the Ratels retired.

The tank squadron had by now come up and engaged the enemy as they withdrew. The Olifants shot out another tank, a BTR-60 and several other vehicles before contact finally broke off when the enemy force drew out of range at 10h00. The fighting had lasted about an hour. The G-5s had kept fire on the enemy force through most of this period, together with the 120 mm mortar battery.

Two Pumas flew forward and collected the casualties at 10h30. Signals intercepts revealed that a large Cuban tank force was on the way to join the force engaged in this lighting. With only a single tank squadron available to him. Mike Muller pulled it and the other combat team back to let the situation develop a little before deciding where to engage again. He also suggested that 32 Battalion should withdraw its elements from the area. as the situation was developing into one that they were not equipped for,

By 10h40 the opposing force had regrouped and was probing in an attempt to turn the flank of the South African force. Several of the 32 Battalion patrols were now encountering enemy elements. They broke contact under cover of G-5 fire and withdrew. Several MiG-23s dropped bombs six kilometres from 102 Battalion elements deployed north of the river. The South African covering force was now ordered to break contact and withdraw. The artillery began withdrawing at 12h55 and crossed the Cunenc into South West Africa, while the elements of 61 Mech remained deployed forward to cover their withdrawal. The tanks crossed the Cunene later that afternoon. The other elements withdrew to the river.

The Cubans, however, did not resume their advance but withdrew to Techipa.

Intelligence later revealed that Nortmann and the tank squadron had clashed with one of three columns that had moved out from Techipa. The force seems to have been a mixed Cuban and Fapla motorised infantry regiment, with 35 tanks and some 600 infantry mounted in APCs and trucks. The column that clashed with the 61 Mech force lost 302 men killed and two T-55s. two BTR-60s and eight trucks destroyed. The South Africans had first estimated about 200 enemy killed, but revised the figure upwards two days later on the basis of intelligence from various sources.

Nortmann drove back to Calueque in his Ratel to get his wounds seen to. the Rinkhals ambulance having already left with the other wounded. He arrived at Calueque to find that the casually evacuation Puma had already left. The doctor treated him in the Rinkhals and then took him along with him. Nortmann could not use his Ratel: all six tyres were flat.

The Air Attack on Calueque
At 13h55 on 27 June, a patrol from 102 Battalion in the hills above Ruacana reported that four MiG-23s had just flown over them heading south-east. At 13h57 more were reported flying from Ruacana towards Calueque. Hougaard was in his tactical headquarters at the time. He sent out a quick warning over the radio and ran outside in time to see the MiGs fly along the river and bank as they lined up for their attack. Then he heard the bombs and saw the smoke and dust of the explosions. Four of the MiGs dropped three bombs each while the other four covered them.

Their bombs gone. the MiGs turned and Hew back over the Calucquc installation before heading north for home. One Cuban pilot displayed true fighter pilot dash. rolling his aircraft and flying over the scene inverted. At 14h05 three more MiGs bombed Calucquc.

Seven MiGs had struck the dam wall with parachute-retarded bombs and scored several hits, which severely damaged the bridge that runs over it. The eighth MiG had turned off and bombed the fresh water pipeline to Owambo. one of his bombs damaging it. Another exploded near a Buffel parked nearby. It killed ten men of 8 SAI who had been standing next to the Buffel. One soldier of 701 Battalion on the bridge was wounded by fragments. Another jumped the four stories down to the spillway and ran away unhurt. Nortmann's luck had held once again; the Rinkhals in which he had been treated and which had just driven off had been parked beside the destroyed Buffel.

The 32 Battalion anti-aircraft troop engaged the MiGs with their 20 mm cannon and scored some hits, A signals intercept revealed later that one MiG crashed on the way back to Lubango.

The air raid on the Calueque installations raised many questions as to its purpose. The Cubans have generally said that it was in response to the fighting that morning given their inability to provide prompt air support for ground forces during the earlier fighting in the south-east; that does not seem very likely. The timing of the events means that they had only two hours between the opening shots of the ground fighting and the arrival of the MiGs over Calueque. Even flying from Cahama, that would suppose a degree of efficiency in their strike planning system that was not demonstrated at any other time.

It is more likely that their reconnaissance had noticed the work on the ramps at the Calueque bridge. This bridge gave the South Africans a second heavy vehicle crossing over the Cunene and the ability to deploy mechanised forces more flexibly. Destroying it would restrict them to the low water bridge at Ruacana which was potentially vulnerable to being sealed off by ground forces- The attack on the Calueque bridge therefore made excellent tactical sense if it was planned to coincide with a more active posture along the border. Without it, the South Africans were unlikely to react forcibly, and might even be induced to withdraw their mechanised forces south of the river lest they should be cut off by a Cuban attack on the Ruacana crossing. Combining this attack with a mechanised advance on the force then known to he deployed at Calueque might have caused the South Africans to withdraw all their forces from north of the Cunene. That would have given the Cubans the victory they needed at little risk. It did not turn out quite as intended because the South Africans pre-empted it with their artillery strike and the deployment of 61 Mech.

The successful air attack on the bridge nevertheless enabled the Cubans to claim a victory, even if it was not as impressive as intended in their planning. It was also not, however, as ineffective as it might seem. The loss of the Calueque bridge did hamper the South Africans considerably, although the fact that no Cuban or Fapla ground forces were able to follow it up meant that the bridge could have been repaired. Perhaps more importantly, the stray bomb that killed ten men raised the political cost of the conflict to the South African government.

At the same time, however, the outcome of the ground fighting on 27 June reminded the Cubans that it would not be a good idea to push for a military success. Fighting the South Africans was too expensive and any further heavy tosses might make it impossible to disengage from Angola without loss of prestige.