

# WAR IN ANGOLA

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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

## Historical Background: Reaction of the black liberation movements

*The sixth part of the series of articles on "THE POWER STRUGGLE IN ANGOLA"*

Even before the coup in Portugal there were indications that all three liberation movements intended to sharply increase their terrorist activities. After the coup they realised that they had to expand their power as far as possible in order to increase their influence in the negotiations. For each of them it was important that the warfare, even in the interim, continued and therefore rejected Spínola's recommendations of a cease fire and referendum. There were understandably distrust in the sincerity of Portugal's decolonisation plans. Therefore the counterclaim was firstly rec-

ognition of independence, then a cease fire.

The three liberation movements had the choice of either getting a combined, or each one its own separate, control of Angola. After apparent honest initial efforts to come to an

agreement between themselves, there were forces which drove them apart. Tribal loyalties, ideological differences, but also the thirst for glory, zeal, and suspicion, could be counted as factors. As the Portuguese control over Angola lessened, the polarity increased.



*The mighty South African G-5 Gun/Howitzer silhouetted against the African sky*

Another element also in play was the attitude and interference of forces outside Angola. For some nations it was important that power was seized by the liberation force from which sympathy and material gain could be expected. For others it was important to find a peaceful, altogether acceptable solution. This last view was also that held by the OAU, which, on

*(Continued on page 2)*

## Featured Gallery:



South African Air Force Mirage F-1 fighters



Allouette III gunship supporting a Koevoet team



South African Paratroops (Parabats) descending after a practice jump

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### Next Week's Features

- The Historical Background series of articles on the POWER STRUGGLE IN ANGOLA continues: "Reaction of the FNLA"
- The durable Mosin-Nagant rifle
- "Ideological background of the blacks" Looking at Portugal's desperate efforts to keep Angola
- Operation Moduler: the battles continue with "21 Brigade Tries Again..."

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## Historical Background: Reaction of the black liberation movements



Angolan officer addressing the men

**Link to this story:**  
<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1085>

*(Continued from page 1)*

numerous occasions indeed, managed to bring the three parties together around the same conference table. Even the heads of state of the surrounding countries, Zaire, Zambia, the People's Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania, worked together with, or independent of, the OAU, towards this same goal.

In Angola itself, after the coup, changes took place that favoured the actions of the liberation movements. As the political prisoners were released and allowed to publicly resume their previously clandestine political activities, the three big movements were also legalised in reality. One after the other opened offices in Luanda and other cities. While they were previ-

ously restricted to rural terrorism, they now had the opportunity to expand their influence to the cities. Each considered a seat in the capital a matter of prestige.

With that occurring, government authority declined. Street fighting and unrest increased. The safety of home and heard became uncertain.

## From the Diary of Lieutenant Colonel Igor Anatolevich Zhdarkin

### October 23, 1987

The enemy shelled us all night. Shells with a very disgusting «howl» and whistling flew both past us and near us. A whole row of them fell very close, on the other bank of the Cuzizi.

In the morning, we have urged the brigade commander to make clear to us where we are. He showed us the wreckage of the air plane hit over the Cunzumbia. According to him, the pilot's corpse had been so badly burned that it was not possible to find any documents on it.

At 8:30 AM, our brigade's artillery discharged several salvos at previously planned targets. We fired BM-21s and D-30 122 millimeter howitzers from temporary positions, and thereupon quickly left our positions. Within less than an hour the South Africans began to fire upon those positions, evidently in order to locate our brigade. While they were firing, generally at random, we attentively lis-

tened to where the shells were flying and fairly often were forced to fall to the ground or "greet our Mother Earth," as our artillery advisor likes to call it.

That evening, we received an order from the Tactical Group Commander, major Batista, to fire upon a South African column in the region of the 59th brigade. Our BM-21 ("Katyusha") could fire 34 shells. In fact, this very much enraged the South Africans because they, almost immediately began shooting back at us from 107-millimeter recoilless guns which could not be silenced until midnight. The BM-21 could just barely move away. Our wretched armored troop carrier shook and we felt very uncomfortable, particularly in view of the howling and whistling of the shells, flying over our heads. They exploded 300 meters away from us. Luckily, the South Africans apparently still had not worked out our brigade's exact location.

### October 24, 1987

This morning, we received an order to depart and go to the 59th brigade, located on the river Mianei. At 11 o'clock, we formed a column and set off. After 3 kilometers, we heard explosions behind us. It was the South Africans shelling who, assuming that we were still there, had begun to bombard our previous positions.

During the day we advanced altogether 6 kilometers. During the march, our water carrier collided with a log and overturned. This pressed down on the leg of one of our guards. With difficulty, we nonetheless managed to set the water carrier back on its wheels.

At 14:20, the column on our left flank was attacked by the enemy and artillery bombardment

*(Continued on page 5)*

"This very much enraged the South Africans because they, almost immediately began shooting back at us from 107-millimeter recoilless guns..."



Soviet advisor at a FAPLA Command Post



## Featured Equipment: The tough R4 battle rifle

The R4 is a superb South African assault rifle developed in 1980 for the South African Army to replace the R1, which was a variant of the FN FAL, and the Heckler & Koch G3s. The R4 was first issued during the early 1980s, and is partly based on the Israeli Galil which in turn was based on the Finnish Rk 62. The Rk 62 was derived from the AK-47. It was manufactured by Lyttleton Engineering Works (LIW).

The R4 makes greater use

of a high-impact nylon/glass fibre mix in its construction than the Galil and is generally stronger and larger than the Israeli gun, although it weighs approximately the same. A bipod fitting comes as standard for the rifle, which also has a wire-cutting feature and a bottle-opener (the latter prevents soldiers opening bottles on precision gun components, such as the magazine receiver lips, and thus damaging them). A further feature is the use of tritium inserts into the sights for night fir-

ing. The R4 is at the top of a series of weapons which includes a carbine version, the R5 and the even shorter R6, with its 280mm (1.10in) barrel.

The R4 was issued to all branches of the South African Defence Force, which used the R4 in the Border War.

For more detailed information on the R4, see Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R4>



The R4 was a versatile weapon well-suited to the harsh conditions of northern South-West Africa and Angola.

## Specifications

Country of Origin:	South Africa
Caliber:	5.56 x 45mm
Length:	1005mm ( 35.97in) stock extended; 740mm (29.13in) stock folded
Weight:	4.3kg (9.48lb)
Barrel:	460mm (18.11in), 6 grooves, rh
Feed/magazine capacity:	30 or 50-round detachable box magazine 5-round detachable box magazine for rifle grenade rounds
Operation:	gas-operated, rotating bolt
Max rate of fire:	650 rpm (Cyclic)
Muzzle velocity:	980 m/s (3,215ft/s)
Effective Range:	500 m (1640ft) plus

*"The R4 is at the top of a series of weapons which includes a carbine version, the R5"*

## The R4 Battle Rifle



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## PORTUGAL'S DESPERATE EFFORTS TO KEEP ANGOLA

### Ideological background: White



Angolan local population being "educated" by armed guerillas

Link to this story:  
<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1057>

"He was now free to work whenever he wanted to, on whatever he wanted to, for whomever he wanted to, for as long as he wanted to; or even not to work at all."

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The Portuguese colonial point of view naturally developed historically.

It would always serve a humane purpose. One writer is under the impression that it can be found as far back as King Henry the Navigator, with his missionary drive as motive for his explorations. (A. Moreira, "**Portugal's stand in Africa**", English translation). While the religious motive eventually faded, the civilization motive stood central in Portuguese exploratory undertakings. That's how it is being reasoned and argued. After Salazar came to power, this policy underwent a new formulation.

With regards to the colonial policy, the critique was focused on the system of forced labour. Overseas writes such as Nevinson, Harris and Ross continually hammered on this evil and as

late as in 1954, Basil Davidson would still find "overwhelming evidence of slavery". (R.H. Chilcote, "**Portuguese Africa**", P. 13.)

Critique also developed from within, amongst others, from people holding important government posts, like Cunha Leal, Manuel de Melo and Pacheco de Amorim.

The man that probably contributed the most to the formulation of the philosophy behind the policy is Gilberto Freyre, in the book that has, in the English translation thereof, the title of **The Masters and the Slaves, A study in the Development of the Brazilian Civilization** (New York, 1964). He created the term "lusotropicalism" or "lusotropicology", which finds its relevance in the Portuguese community established in the tropics as it crystallized in Brazil.

(Luso comes from the word Lusotani, the Roman name for the original Celtic inhabitants of Portugal and bordering areas of the current Spain). A similar lusotropical community as what existed in Brazil, where the Portuguese culture remained intact, had to be aspired to in Angola and other Portuguese colonies.

Someone that contributes hereto, is Adriano Moreira, well-knowns writer and professor at the Institute of Foreign Study at the Technical University of Lisbon, who became Minister of Foreign Possessions in 1961. He published a book in 1962, **Portugal's stand in Africa** (English translation), in which he finds justification for the Portuguese colonial policy in the "lusotropicology" of Freyre. According to him "the same lusotropical pattern of mixed and

Their policy were not valid any longer...

sympiotic societies and cultures" were developing in Angola and Mozambique, "which can hardly be confused with the colonial dominions of the British, the French and the Dutch in the tropics". (A. Moreira, "**Portugal's stand in Africa**", p.154.)

By 1962 Portugal realized that certain aspects of their policy were not valid any longer. Adaptations had to be made without just abandoning the policy. In August 1961 Moreira announced that the *Estatuto dos*

*Indiginas* would be abolished. All blacks now became normal Portuguese citizens, regardless of their level of development. In the foreign provinces a greater representation of the normal population were allocated to the local councils. (Texts about this can be found in Moreira's book, P.232.) An important change occurred in 1962 when the Labour Code, through which contract labourers were recruited in the past, was abolished. Thus the African's

"moral obligation to work" had expired. He was now free to work whenever he wanted to, on whatever he wanted to, for whomever he wanted to, for as long as he wanted to; or even not to work at all.

After this a serious effort was put into winning Angola for the Portuguese point of view. Colonization was strongly stimulated and the number of immigrants increased rapidly. Education among the

(Continued on page 8)

Historical Account:

Operation Moduler: First Clashes — 47 Brigade, Part 4

Extract taken with the author's permission from: "War In Angola - The Final South African Phase", by Helmoed-Römer Heitman

*The battle continues, Part 4...*

At 16h00 Combat Group Charlie was ordered to move up to recover or destroy the vehicles that had been left on the objective. Dawid Lotter was assured by Unita that

there was no enemy left on the objective, so he moved off despite being short of 81 mm illumination bombs. The indefatigable Hannes Nortmann went along to guide them to the vehicles to be recovered two Casspirs - and destroyed - also two Casspirs. The artillery, meanwhile, shelled 59 Brigade before its nightly redeployment.

The Unita guide became increasingly nervous as the force approached the

objective. Another Unita soldier came up to the vehicles and asked them how they intended to deal with the tank ambush. This was unpleasant news for Lotter, who was now faced with a night fight for which he was ill prepared. He had deployed his force by 19h00. A platoon of Ratel-20s and a troop of Ratel-90s were interspersed in column on each flank with the group commander riding just

*(Continued on page 6)*



South African Casspir Armoured Personnel Carrier temporarily disabled by a landmine—soon to be back in action

This week, 23 Years Ago, In South-East Angola...

**Friday, 5 February 1988: Tanks east of the Cuito River**

By 5 February there were some forty-four tanks with the Fapla brigades and Tactical Group 2 east of the river. Twenty were with the tactical group, fourteen with 21 Brigade, and five each with 59 and 25

Brigades....

**Saturday, 6 February 1988: Fapla used a crane on the Cuito bridge**

On the morning of 6 February Fapla was seen to be using a crane on the Cuito bridge, perhaps to

help move vehicles over a damaged section. Several SAAF aircraft attacked the bridge during the day, but no result could be observed....

**Sunday, 7 February 1988: Cuban convoy struck by SAAF**

*(Continued on page 7)*

"Several SAAF aircraft attacked the bridge during the day"

From the Diary of Lieutenant Colonel Igor Anatolevich Zhdarkin

*(Continued from page 2)*

began. The battle lasted twenty minutes.

At 15:40, the enemy once again bombarded our column with gunfire and mortar fire. One of these mortar shells exploded 20 meters away from our armored troop carrier, between two cars of the "Enges" model. The wheels of both cars were pierced with fragments. One Angolan perished and several people were wounded.

Around 17:00, I went to the communications pla-

toon of our brigade in order to transmit information to Cuito via radio station "Racal". No sooner had I gotten ready to transmit when the firing of sub-machine guns began, and then mortar fire. Several bullets whizzed past, and I only just succeeded in jumping off the armored troop carrier and to creep under it, next to several members of the Angolan signal corps who were already there. Even the dog of the brigade commander was hiding there and timidly whined after every shell

burst.

When the shooting had stopped, I went back to our (advisor's) armored troop carrier, deciding to transmit information by our R-123 radio station. I had only just climbed aboard when the firing of shells began again and continued without interruption during the 20 minutes I was transmitting.

Night passed quietly. Only around 22:00 did they begin shooting at us several times.



Soviet advisors in an Angolan village

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## Historical Account: Operation Moduler: First Clashes — 47 Brigade, Part 4



South African Infantry in the bush

*(Continued from page 5)*

inside the centre of the column, and the remaining platoon was following in reserve. Letter now began his sweep of the area, moving only about 1 800 metres over the next three hours because of the darkness, his lack of illumination rounds, the dense bush and the many huts and trenches that had to be checked as he advanced. Just before 22h00 he decided to begin burning the huts

along his command axis to mark it clearly. They had recovered only two of the Casspirs at that point, and were looking for the other two.

He had hardly begun moving again, when eight tanks sprang their ambush from as near as 100 metres from the Ratels of the right hand group. Struck by massive firepower from such close range, the group's cohesion was shattered at first. Control was not helped when the lieutenant in command of it lost

communications and then his orientation. All the vehicles of this group promptly returned their radios to Letter's frequency, which further hampered him, particularly as he was already forced to use manpack radios as a result of not having a proper command Ratel.

Lotter ordered Lieutenant Kooij, commanding his left group, to move forward and take control there, while he struggled to restore overall control. Kooij drove forward and

The situation was, nevertheless, still untenable...

"He had hardly begun moving again, when eight tanks sprang their ambush from as near as 100 metres from the Ratels of the right hand group."

immediately engaged the Fapla tanks, restoring cohesion at the front of the force and gaining Letter time to re-establish control over his force. The situation was, nevertheless, still untenable. Fapla were fighting from positions in known terrain, while Lotter and his men were forced to feel their way in the dark, through an area criss-crossed with trenches that could be fatal to an unwary Ratel, as had been proved only that

afternoon. Artillery now also entered the picture, firing at Letter's force from the positions north of the Lomba. At least one BM-21 also began to engage them with direct fire.

Letter now requested and received permission to break off and pull his force out of the area. While he was organising his withdrawal, a number of Fapla tanks began to manoeuvre around his southern flank. Lieutenant

ant Kooij engaged these tanks and shot out two of them. He then continued to hold a line opposite the Fapla force with his troop, to cover the withdrawal of the main force.

Letter now pulled back in 100 metre bounds, with control points established along the command axis to ensure that everyone was accounted for. It nevertheless proved impossible to make a clean break, not least because the ac-

Trapped between the Ratels and the Fapla tanks...

companying Unita infantry had become dispersed and detached from the Ratels, and some of them were now trapped between the Ratels and the Fapla tanks. At 02h00, Fapla stopped firing for no obvious reason. This gave Letter the opportunity he had been seeking, and he quickly regrouped and broke contact.

Miraculously, Combat Group Charlie suffered no serious casualties in this intense fighting. The leader of 71 Troop was hurt by the recoil of his 90 mm gun, and a corporal was slightly wounded by a bullet which penetrated his 'bone dome' and stuck in his skull. It was simply pulled out and he went on with the fight.

Bravo returned to the old Unita logistic base in the morning to mop up and clear up the battlefield. They found that Fapla had lost between 250 and 300 men killed in the two clashes, and had lost five tanks and a single Ural truck, which had somehow become involved in the fighting. A TMM bridging vehicle

*(Continued on page 7)*



A Ratel-90 of the Armoured (Charlie) Squadron of a Mechanised Infantry Battalion

## Historical Account:

## Operation Moduler: First Clashes — 47 Brigade, Part 4

*(Continued from page 6)*

was abandoned on the scene.

Combat Group Charlie spent the 14th resting and repairing their equipment. The 15th was Lieutenant Kooij's birthday, marked by an air attack just as Dawid Letter was congratulating him. Again, however, there were no casualties. That afternoon Charlie

was ordered to move up as reserve for Alpha, which was now to attack 47 Brigade.

47 Brigade withdrew the remnants of its Tactical Group, and put off its attempts to join up with 59 Brigade for the time being. It thus remained cut off from the main force north of the Lomba and, far from securing their crossings as planned, was now in

grave danger itself and running out of ammunition and fuel. The result of this confusing clash in the bush and trenches of the old Unita logistic base was, thus, that the initiative had passed to the South African force. But it was still too weak to exploit the opportunity effectively.



A Ratel moves along a dirt track

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## This week, 23 Years Ago, In South-East Angola...

*(Continued from page 5)*

The Cuban convoy, having had been engaged by the rocket launchers of 32 Battalion on 6 February, was then attacked by the SAAF during the morning of 7 February. The air strike was followed by secondary explosions which went on for some twenty minutes. Smoke was still over the target area at 11h00....

**Monday, 8 February 1988: SAAF Air Defence Group arrived**

On 8 February an element of the SAAF Air Defence Group arrived at Mavinga on a two-week deployment, with two Cactus launcher vehicles and six 23 mm guns....

**Tuesday, 9 February**

**1988: SAAF air-defence element deployed**

The gun section and its protection element would deploy in the shona opposite the south-eastern corner of the 21 Brigade position while 61 Mech moved up and remained there during the main attack on 59 Brigade. The air defence element would deploy on high ground just north of 59 Brigades's outer positions. The SA-7 detachment would deal with aircraft flying north-south overhead....

**Wednesday, 10 February 1988: Additional strengthening measures by Fapla**

By 10 February, close reconnaissance of the Fapla positions had revealed additional strengthening measures, and some BM-21s with

59 Brigade, and additional troops - mainly recruits - with 21 Brigade....

**Thursday, 11 February 1988: 61 Mech combat team sent to the Chambinga source**

61 Mech sent a combat team to the Chambinga source area on 11 February to clear Fapla from there. Before it arrived there, however, the Fapla reconnaissance patrol in that area had clashed with elements of Unita's 5th Regular Battalion and had pulled back....

"The air strike was followed by secondary explosions which went on for some twenty minutes."

**Link to this story:**

<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=574>



Camouflaged G-5 Gun/Howitzer been readied for action

## Uittreksel uit "Ag man dit 'WAS' lekker in die Army" - van Danie Matthee



South African Civilian Force infantry in the back of a Samil truck somewhere on the border



### Link to this story:

<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1092>

Toentertyd was Walvisbaai een van die plekke waar aangewese dienspligtiges vir opleiding gaan aanmeld het. Dan gaan dit maar dol. Party ouens kom per trein. Ander met busse en karre. En sommiges se ouers besorg hulle daar. Eendag, gedurende so 'n ge- maal van mense, is daar weer 'n klop aan die deur van Kol. Gleeson. Die Adjutant stap in. "Kolonel, hier is nog 'n ma met haar seun wat u wil sien." "Bring hulle gerus in." Hulle stap gedwee binne. Die Adjutant onttrek hom. Kol. Gleeson wend hom tot die ma: "Mevrou, seun, sit, laat ons gesels." Die vrou gaan sit be- dees op die rand van die stoel met haar voete langs mekaar en haar handsakke op die

skoot. "Kolonel, ek het gekom om ...." Hy stel haar dadelik gerus: "Mevrou, moenie be- kommerd wees nie. Los u seun hier by my, ek sal sorg dat hy gou aandag kry, alles sal reg gaan. Waar woon u?"

"Walvisbaai"

"Goed. Gaan nou maar gerus huis toe. U sal later weer van ons hoor." En so is die ma daar weg.

Reëlings word toe getref en 'n Koporaal kom haal die seun. Eers word hy geneem vir die inskrywing, en daarna vir die uitreiking by die kwartiermeester- pakhuis. Daar is hy weg soos 'n pakdonkie gelaai met oorpakke, lakens, ens na sy bun- galow toe. 'n Paar dae later kom die ma weer daaraan. Sy wil vir

Kol. Gleeson sien. Toe, met 'n gesig vol kommer, sê sy hui- werig vir hom: "Kolonel, waar's my seun? Hoe lank vat dit julle dan om kennis van adresverandering aan te teken?" Die arme seun was nooit daar om aan te meld vir opleiding nie. Dit was natuurlik 'n groot verleentheid. Kol. Gleeson maak groot verskoning en laat hom dadelik roep. Maar toe hy vir hom sê hy kan nou maar terug gaan huis toe, skop die mannetjie vas en sê hy wil bly. Kol. Gleeson is 'n groot man. Hy is ewewigtig en nederig. Hy het 'n sin vir humor, maar hierdie keer was sy gesig rooi.

Generaal J Geldenhuys

## PORTUGAL'S DESPERATE EFFORTS TO KEEP ANGOLA

### Ideological background: White

(Continued from page 4)

black population was extended (in the Portu- guese language, of course), as was social services. Enthusiastic attempts were made to convert the black popula- tion into believing that they were Portuguese, while the policy of inte- gration was strongly em- phasized.

Even so, it was not suc- cessful. The terror gradually caused Portu- gal to lose its control. Then, at quarter-to- midnight, there was yet another attempt to refor- mulate Portuguese pol-

icy. That was the book of Antonio de Spinoia, **Por- tugal e o Futuro**, which was published in 1973.

He came to the conclu- sion that there were no mere military solution to the wars in Africa, Ac- cording to him there was "only one way to end the conflict... and that an eminently political one."

He was convinced that Portugal still had the goodwill of the Western forces, because the re- sources of the areas were of great importance to the West.

Therefore it was neces- sary to find a solution

that would address and satisfy all layers of the Portuguese population, white and black, as well as the foreign world. The solution he proposed did not differ much from the Portuguese ideology that up till then made up the mainstay of policy. He still believed in a unified state, a "plural-national- state" as he referred to it sometimes, and also a "plural-continental coun- try", populated by 92 million Portuguese.

He believed that the sup- port of the black man could be trusted and relied upon. "we know

(Continued on page 9)



Artillery shells being carried by hand—sometimes the only way to get supplies in the bush

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## SADF Order of Battle: Operation Moduler, 6 Sept - 30 Oct 1987

### 20 SA Brigade - from 6 September 1987

#### Brigade Headquarters, 20 SA Brigade

1 Platoon, Delta Company, 32 Battalion  
 2 Platoon, Delta Company, 32 Battalion  
 HMG Section, 32 Battalion  
 Chemical Warfare Advisory Team  
 Mobile Air Operations Team #1, SAAF  
 Medical Team  
 Recce Team 1, 5 Reconnaissance Regiment  
 Recce Team 2, 5 Reconnaissance Regiment  
 Recce Team 3, 5 Reconnaissance Regiment  
 Recce Team 4, 5 Reconnaissance Regiment  
 320 FACP, SAAF  
 Engineer Troop, 25 Field Squadron  
 Electronic Warfare Section  
 Support Company, 32 Battalion

#### Combat Group Alpha

Headquarters, Combat Group Alpha  
 Alpha Company, 61 Mech Bn Grp  
 Charlie A/C Squadron, 61 Mech Bn Grp  
 Golf Company, 32 Battalion  
 81mm Fire Group, 61 Mech Bn Grp  
 Anti-Aircraft Troop, 61 Mech Bn Grp  
 Mobile Air Operations Team #2, SAAF  
 Artillery Observation Team, 20 Artillery Regiment  
 Medical Team

#### Combat Group Bravo

Headquarters, Combat Group Bravo  
 Foxtrot Company, 32 Battalion  
 3 Platoon, Delta Company, 32 Battalion  
 902 Company, 101 Battalion  
 903 Company, 101 Battalion  
 Anti-Tank Squadron, 32 Battalion  
 81mm Fire Group, 32 Battalion  
 106mm RR Section, 32 Battalion  
 HMG Section, 32 Battalion  
 1st Recce Team, 32 Battalion  
 2nd Recce Team, 32 Battalion  
 Mobile Air Operations Team #3, SAAF  
 Artillery Observation Team, 20 Artillery Regiment  
 Forward Air controller, SAAF  
 Medical Team

#### Combat Group Charlie

Headquarters, Combat Group Charlie  
 Bravo Company, 61 Mech Bn Grp  
 Anti-Tank Platoon, 61 Mech Bn Grp  
 81mm Fire Group, 61 Mech Bn Grp  
 Medical Team

#### 20 Artillery Regiment

Regimental Headquarters, 20 Artillery Regiment

#### Quebec Battery, 20 Artillery Regiment

C Troop, Quebec Battery, 20 Artillery Regiment  
 D Troop, Quebec Battery, 20 Artillery Regiment  
 1 Platoon, Bravo Company, 32 Battalion  
 2 Platoon, Bravo Company, 32 Battalion  
 Stinger Team 3, UNITA  
 Stinger Team 4, UNITA  
 Stinger Team 5, UNITA  
 Stinger Team 6, UNITA  
 SA-7 Team 3  
 SA-7 Team 4  
 Mobile Air Operations Team #5, SAAF

#### Pappa Battery, 20 Artillery Regiment

A Troop, Pappa Battery, 20 Artillery Regiment  
 B Troop, Pappa Battery, 20 Artillery Regiment  
 Charlie Company, 32 Battalion  
 Anti-Aircraft Troop, 32 Battalion  
 Stinger Team 1, UNITA  
 Stinger Team 2, UNITA  
 SA-7 Team 1  
 SA-7 Team 2  
 Mobile Air Operations Team #4, SAAF

#### Sierra Battery, 20 Artillery Regiment

G Troop, Sierra Battery, 20 Artillery Regiment  
 H Troop, Sierra Battery, 20 Artillery Regiment  
 3 Platoon, Bravo Company, 32 Battalion

*More about the vehicles, armament, equipment and men of each subunit in forthcoming issues of this newsletter...*



South African Ratels advance through the bush in Angola



### TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SADF!

Write the names of the units represented by the flashes below each one.

*Find the answers in next week's issue!*

## PORTUGAL'S DESPERATE EFFORTS TO KEEP ANGOLA

Ideological background: White

*(Continued from page 8)*

that we can count on acceptance due to lack of racial prejudice: we know how to get along with people of different

cultures and win their friendship." (Antonio de Spínola, "Portugal and the Future", pp. 20, 22, 92, 97, 98 and 101.) He believed in the possibility to make all races equal.

His solution is widely based on a free federation of Portugal and its colonies and Brazil, of which the hub not necessarily had to be in Portugal.

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Please send your event notices to [info@warinangola.com](mailto:info@warinangola.com)

### Schedule of Events

- 12 February 2011 — Lowveld District MOTH Annual Pro Patria Parade
- 14 - 16 February 2011 — Submarine Capabilities & Requirements Summit
- 14 - 16 February 2011 — 4th Annual NextGen Avionics Summit
- 14 - 16 February 2011 — CBRNE Defense 2011
- 16 February 2011 — 61 Meg Skouer-skuur, Port Elizabeth
- 21 - 22 February 2011 — Seaport Security India
- 22 - 24 February 2011 — Directed Energy Weapons 2011, UK
- 23 - 24 February 2011 — Tactical Data Links 2011
- 26 - 27 February 2011 — 18th MSSA North West Board Gaming & Wargaming Championships


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		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
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
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
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Mark Raats has created this **SPECIAL EDITION** high quality 900mm x 600mm poster of his original artwork, "An Unpopular War", SPECIFICALLY and EXCLUSIVELY for the users of WarInAngola.com. This is the same artwork which has proven such a direct hit in the form of the complimentary "OUMAN" sticker we have been sending out to all SADF

Veterans, courtesy of Danie Matthee, with the kind permission and specific design provided by Mark. This high quality poster is now available for only **R300, plus R50 handling and postage** anywhere in South Africa. Postage to the rest of the world will be added accordingly. Please enquire first as to the cost thereof.



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In order to continue expanding the site and adding additional functionality it is essential that some sort of revenue is generated to overcome the ever-increasing costs.

While by no means minimising the information available to Public and Registered users (which is what attracts all the attention in the first place), it takes considerable time and effort to research, find and publish new information all the time.

To this effect, some new information will only be made available to Registered users that have subscribed to the annual PREMIUM MEMBERSHIP.

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
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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

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The War In Angola website ([www.warinangola.com](http://www.warinangola.com)) is dedicated to recreating and re-fighting the battles between the adversaries of the Angolan War (or Border War as it is also known), that is, the SADF and UNITA on the one side and the Soviet-supplied FAPLA, Cuba, and SWAPO on the other side. In order to recreate the battles as accurate as possible, a lot of research is required about the equipment, organisation, quality, uniforms, command, support and logistical structures behind the different forces.

There are two sides to the website: the gaming and recreation of the miniature battles; and the historical facts and research of the forces behind the battles.

The dividing line between the two sides is deliberately blurred in order to expose both sides to all the users, thereby promoting and exposing the wargaming and modeling hobby to the historically inclined and vice-versa.

Johan Schoeman

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## Last week's latest topics on the Forums

### RE: Painting your Models by johansamin

We have just finished painting our first BIG batch of 1/300 SADF vehicles and those orderw will be sent out shortly. There were also quite a few modern SANDF vehicles ordered but all were required to...

### RE: Please feel free to post your views and comments by Ed Clay (guest)

I am a friend of Koos Maritz and he is one of the best men I have ever known. I am proud to have worked with him.

### RE: Bren and Browning 7,62 conversions by pfv

Hi, Mexican Dave, and many thanks for the comment. As you probably know, the original .303 Browning stopped firing with the breech in closed position, leading to runaways if the barrels were too hot. ...

### RE: Bren and Browning 7,62 conversions by Mexican Dave

I did a course with NMR (a reserve force tank regiment) on the .50 and 7.62 Brownings in about 2006. So the 7.62 Browning is still around and it shoots fantastically. The first ones I saw were at Eenha...

### RE: Olifant Tank - H Sqdn by johansamin

Hi, H-sqn. I have posted my personal story about the three Olifant tanks left behind at Cuito Cuanavale on my WarBlog at <http://blogs.warinangola.com/Home/tabid/167/EntryId/2/-Trying-to-destroy-t...>

### RE: Russian Prisoner(s) of War by Jim Hooper

Feetloose-- Contact me through my website. Jim

### Olifant Tank - H Sqdn by H-sqn

First squadron posted at 61 and took part in Cuito. Left 3 behind due to mines, wold like this vehicle and crews mentioned for there contribution if anyone is keen.SH

### RE: Russian Prisoner(s) of War by Feetloose

Hi Jim, Thanks for your comment. I have already read everything on your site and had a look at all your pictures, awesome. I read on another site (armyranger..) that you will sent the typescript in Wo...

### RE: Bren and Browning 7,62 conversions by pfv

That is a laugh, Farmer Brown! Despite the real possibility of injury. Back in 81 TSD in 1974 we acquired a new ADK plastic pip who was extremely kop toe - Meneer Paraat himself. He decided we all nee...

### RE: Bren and Browning 7,62 conversions by farmer brown

This incident happened in august 1978. Another intresting tale that comes to mind was near eenhana base. we were an engineering troop attached to an infantry unit to supply them with water and do thei...