

# WAR IN ANGOLA

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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

## Historical Background: Terms of Alvor

*The eleventh part of the series of articles on "THE POWER STRUGGLE IN ANGOLA"*

The fact that Portugal only acknowledged the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA as the only representatives of Angola at Alvor, resulted in that no other Angolan party or political organisation, white or black, had any further rights to existence. Supporters of these organisations therefore had no other choice than to join one of the acknowledged three.

The three undertook under the Alvor agreement to co-exist and work together in peace. They each got equal representation in the coalition government which would be established on 31

January 1975. (J. Marcum, "The Angolan Revolution", Vol. II, p. 236.)

With regards to military issues, it was decided on the creation of a National Defence Committee which comprised of the High Commissioner, the Presidential Committee, and the United General Staff. The last comprised of the three commanders of respectively the Portuguese land, air, and sea forces as well as the military commanders of each of the nationalistic movements. This defence committee would then be responsible for the combining and integration of a military force comprising of 8 000 soldiers each of the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, and 24 000 of the Portuguese Defence

Force. Portugal had undertaken to evacuate Portuguese soldiers from Angola gradually from 1 October 1975. The interim coalition government was also tasked to ensure that a general election for a constitutional assembly would take place within

*(Continued on page 8)*



*South African infantry on a dawn patrol*

## Featured Gallery:



*SA Special Forces Operator collection information about the enemy*



*UNITA infantry crossing an open shana in south-east Angola*



*SAAF Alouette III helicopter landing in the bush*

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### Next Week's Features

- The Historical Background series of articles on the POWER STRUGGLE IN ANGOLA continues: "Background to internal strife"
- Featured Equipment: The excellent Astra Star pistol
- "UNITA in war" Looking at Portugal's desperate efforts to keep Angola
- Operation Moduler: the battles continue with "The Attack on 16 Brigade, Part 2"

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## Historical Account:

## Operation Moduler: The Attack on 16 Brigade, Part 1



Olifant tanks were used in an attack for the first time

Extract taken with the author's permission from: "War In Angola - The Final South African Phase", by Helmoed-Römer Heitman

The combat groups moved up into the forward assembly areas during the night of 6 to 7 November and spent that day replenishing and preparing their equipment. Alpha deployed on the west bank of the Cuzizi, eight kilometres south-east of its source; Charlie and Romeo Battery (120 mm mortar) moved up ten kilometres

north of the old Portuguese road to the area of Mupende, and from there to a point directly north of the Chaminga source. The G-6 troop deployed north of the Vicuso source. Observation posts were deployed north-west of 16 Brigade and north-east of the Chaminga bridge. Final co-ordination of the operation was discussed during the evening of 7 November at Lake Capua, and the combat groups gave their own orders on 8 November. Detailed orders were given using a sand

model of the 16 Brigade positions, built on the basis of air reconnaissance photographs amplified with information provided by Special Forces and Unita reconnaissance teams and the forward observers. Charlie moved out of its forward assembly area at 17h00 on 8 November.

One of the forward observers. Major Cassie van der Merwe, had spent the past few days in observation posts within 800 to 2 000 metres of the 16 Brigade

*(Continued on page 5)*

## From the Diary of Lieutenant Colonel Igor Anatolevich Zhdarkin

## Link to this story:

<http://www.warinangola.com/default.aspx?tabid=1090>

"During the night, from 22.00 to 23.30, the enemy bombarded us from 155-millimeter cannons..."



Soviet advisor posing with the Fapla forces he is attached to

**November 5, 1987**

Today, at midday, the first battalion returned. It brought yet another radio station, captured at the same base. At the same time, documents of UNITA's 4th regular battalion, which operates in that district, were also taken from that base. Among these documents there is a diary of military activity from June 1986 to September, 1987. In it, all groups of our forces are listed, including also its leadership, the results of the 4th regular battalion battles, its victories and its losses. There is a map of the Cunjamba district, made in Lisbon according to aerial photographs, and an outline of Cuito-Cuanavale district, drawn by hand. Letters and other miscellaneous pieces of paper were captured too.

**November 6, 1987**

During the night, between 21.00 and 23.00, the enemy once again bombarded us from his "Kentrons" and from recoilless guns. As a result, two men were killed and one wounded.

Today the Soviet Senior Advisor to the Military District Command congratulated us with the coming holiday, and sent a telegram from Cuito. In response, we also congratulated all of them.

And today, our Brigade Artillery Commander told us that the coordinates of that gun battery which was constantly bombarding us had finally been determined and should it again begin to fire on us, then our own artillery would be in a position to retaliate. Let us wait and see.

At 17 hours, the enemy's reconnaissance group

stumbled upon our own forces in the district of our first infantry battalion. There was powerful crossfire but no serious results.

**November 7, 1987**

During the night, from 22.00 to 23.30, the enemy bombarded us from 155-millimeter cannons, and also from "Kentrons", from the source of the river Lomba. Our own forces retaliated by firing against the Kentrons from BM-21s and D-30s. So far, the results are still unknown. Our advanced battalion posts send us news about cars moving from the source of the river Lomba across the Lukaia and

*(Continued on page 7)*

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## Featured Equipment: The handy Makarov pistol

The standard Soviet side arm from the late 1950s, the Pistolet Makarov is recognizably based on the excellent Walther PP. features transferred from the PP into the Makarov—although without as much elegance of form and function—are the double-action trigger pull and the locking/unlocking catch for the hammer. Where it does diverge, however, is in the caliber.

The Makarov uses a 9 x 18mm cartridge that falls somewhere between the

9mm Parabellum and the 9mm Short, thus making the gun incompatible with much of the Western world's ammunition, but still enabling it to operate safely on the blowback system.

Despite being somewhat bulkier than the Walther model, the Makarov is a solid performer regardless of environment and it spread throughout the communist world, particularly to China (the Type 59) and the former East Germany (Pistolet M).

*(Twentieth-Century Small Arms, by Chris McNab)*

For more detailed information on the Makarov, see Wikipedia:  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Makarov>



Both SWAPO guerillas pictured here are wearing side arms, probably Makarov or Tokarev pistols

### Specifications

Country of Origin:	USSR/Russia
Caliber:	9 x 18mm Soviet
Length butt open/folded:	160mm (6.3in)
Weight:	0.663kg (1.46lb)
Barrel:	91mm (3.5in) 4 grooves, rh
Feed/magazine capacity:	8-round detachable box magazine
Operation:	blowback
Muzzle velocity:	315mps (1033fps)
Effective Range:	40m (131ft)

"The Makarov is a solid performer regardless of environment and it spread throughout the communist world"

### The Makarov pistol



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## PORTUGAL'S DESPERATE EFFORTS TO KEEP ANGOLA

### The MPLA in war



FNLA troops of the MPLA with some Cuban presence. Note the prevalence of AK-47s

**Link to this story:**  
<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1061>

"The MPLA was no longer welcome in Kinshasa, and they moved across the river to Brazzaville."

After 1961 the MPLA continued operating rather remotely with some units in the south of the Dembos. The movement declined until it barely existed by 1963. Even so, a small group of Marxists at the head of the organisation persisted. They were supported by communists all over the world: Eastern Europe, Russia, Cuba and also China. Because of his communist intentions, the USA turned its back on Agostinho Neto in 1963.

During the MPLA's first conference from 1 to 3 December 1962, in Kinshasa, the foundation of an organised structure was laid. Agostinho Neto was voted president; the post of Foreign Affairs was given to Mário de Andrade; the post of Military Matters was given to Manuel Lima;

while the key post of political organiser was entrusted to the able Lucio Lara. Viriato da Cruz was pushed out of the organisation due to political differences.

After another unsuccessful effort to unite the MPLA and the FNLA, the MPLA was no longer welcome in Kinshasa, and they moved across the river to Brazzaville.

As did America, other Western countries also did not support the openly communistic MPLA. As opposed to that, the Marxist states supported them uninterrupted until 1971. For his visit to Moscow in 1964, Neto was rewarded with a consignment of armament. From 1965, Russian and Cuban cargo ships delivered supplies to the MPLA in Pointe Noira.

For recruiting, Neto was dependent on the Mbundu-tribe which honoured him as a national hero. Furthermore, his organisation also enjoyed the support of *mulatos* and *assimilados*. The Portuguese espionage service PIDE (**Policia Internacional a Defesa do Estado**), later changed to DGS (**Direção Geral de Segurança**), effectively prevented the expansion of the MPLA's influence in urban areas.

From 1961, young members of the MPLA went for military training in Algerian bases, in Ghana and Morocco, of which about 300, well trained and equipped, formed the core of the EPLA (**Exercito Popular de Libertação de Angola**) in 1962, and who could initiate the conflict.

(Continued on page 6)

## This week, 23 Years Ago, In South-East Angola...

### Saturday, 12 March 1988: 82 SA Brigade took over command

The 82 SA Brigade staff took over from the 20 SA Brigade on the 12th....

### Sunday, 13 March 1988: End of Operation Hooper - start of Packer

The 20 SA Brigade headquarters moved back to Rundu on 13 March. Operation Hooper had ended! The 82 SA brigade staff had formally relieved the staff of 20 SA Brigade. The operations order for the next attack was now renamed Operation Packer....

### Monday, 14 March 1988: Fapla defences

The infantry of Fapla's 25 Brigade was dug-in in well-prepared trench lines stretching from the Cuanavale to the Tumpo. Apparent gaps in the positions were covered by at least five 23 mm guns and ten 82 mm B-10 recoilless anti-tank guns sited to enfilade any force that attempted to penetrate them....

### Tuesday, 15 March 1988: Fapla defences further consolidated

Five GRAD-Ps were also deployed in the main 25 Brigade positions. Ten

tanks were in prepared hull-down firing positions behind the infantry positions. Nine 122 mm D-30 guns were deployed about 100 metres behind the main positions. Warning minefields were placed on all feasible approaches with five mobile tanks deployed between two outposts placed well forward of the main defensive positions. Tactical Group 2, now consisting mainly of the partly Cuban-manned 3 Tank Battalion, was in the bridge area as a mobile reserve and destruction force. It had at least fourteen

(Continued on page 5)

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Cubans with an 82mm B-10 recoilless anti-tank gun

Historical Account:

Operation Moduler: The Attack on 16 Brigade, Part 1

*(Continued from page 2)*

positions. He had studied its dispositions and routines during that period and had also engaged several targets in the area. He was also one of the officers controlling the artillery support for the attack by Combat Group Charlie.

The attack began at 01h00 on 9 November with Combat Group Bravo launching its probing attack from the south. Charlie crossed the start line, eight kilometres from the objective, at 04h00, dropping off the echelon and the surgical post here. Less than an hour later it deployed into block formation, with the companies and squadrons in their appropriate positions but still moving in columns. Shortly thereafter Charlie stopped to wait for the artillery to shoot their fire plan, beginning at

05h30. The force began moving again at 05h41, through bush which was steadily becoming thicker.

At 06h00 Combat Group Charlie was about four kilometres from the objective and deployed into combat formation, the squadrons and companies shaking out from columns into battle order.

The armoured car squadron and D Company of 32 Battalion deployed as a screen across the front. E-Squadron, with two troops up and one following in depth, moved behind them. The mechanised infantry companies, A and B, deployed behind the tanks in platoon columns on the left and right. The 120 mm mortars had deployed west of the axis some four kilometres from the objective. Unita elements moved in

ahead of Charlie to establish contact with Fapla, but liaison and communications difficulties plagued this part of the attack. One result of these difficulties was that the presence of Unita troops ahead of Charlie made it difficult to distinguish friend from foe and caused the attack to lose momentum.

Mirage F-1AZs of 1 Squadron hit the 16 Brigade positions at 06h30, after which the artillery resumed shelling targets in the brigade area. The G-6's fired their first operational rounds as a part of this bombardment. Alpha's diversionary attack went in at 07h00, with as much vehicle noise as it could make. 16 Brigade reacted immediately, placing indirect fire on the approaching elements of Alpha. Reaching its closest line to Brigade, Alpha

*(Continued on page 6)*



A 155mm G-6 self-propelled gun of the South African Artillery, seeing action for the first time

“The G-6's fired their first operational rounds as a part of this bombardment.”

This week, 23 Years Ago, In South-East Angola...

*(Continued from page 4)*

tanks. Strong artillery elements were deployed all over the high ground on the west bank, from where they could very effectively place observed fire on all approaches to the Tumpo area. The weapons available included 122 mm D-30 gun-howitzers, 130 mm M-46 guns, 122 mm BM-21 and 140 mm BM-14 multiple rocket launchers....

**day, 16 March 1988: Plan for the attack accepted**  
The plan for the new attack, completed on 11 March, was presented for approval on 16 March and accepted as it was, except for a few details. The plan was discussed with Unita officers to finalise details of their part in it. Colonel Fouché requested a postponement to 25 March to clear up logistic difficulties, but accepted a ruling by Brigadier Smit that the attack was to go in on 23 March at the latest....

**Thursday, 17 March 1988: MiGs active**  
The MiGs were active on 17 and 18 March, searching for the new South African positions. Several also attacked a convoy on 17 March....


**Friday, 18 March 1988: G-5s hit the GSP ferries**  
On 18 March the G-5s hit two of the GSP ferries now also being used at the bridge site, blew a hole a metre across in one and quite badly damaged the other....

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Well camouflaged G-5 gun in action

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## Historical Account:

## Operation Moduler: The Attack on 16 Brigade, Part 1



Observing the fall of shot of an artillery bombardment

"The Olifants of E Squadron took up firing positions before continuing the advance in very short bounds"

(Continued from page 5)

fired into the Fapla positions with its 90 mm guns and 81 mm mortars.

At 06h35 the leading troops passed the first abandoned foxholes. At much the same time one of the artillery observers reported that a BM-21 had been hit by the G-5s and that several vehicles in the Fapla position were burning. Two minutes later, another observer reported that a tank had started up near the burning vehicles. Task Force headquarters now informed Charlie that Fapla tanks were forming up north of the old Portuguese road, that is, on the south-east side of the 16 Brigade position, facing Alpha.

Alpha began withdrawing at 06h41, having drawn a reaction from Fapla as intended, and having instructions not to become engaged with tanks. They were by now also drawing some quite accurate artillery fire.

Combat Group Charlie meanwhile continued moving in on 16 Brigade on the northern side of its positions, still without drawing any fire. At 06h39 B Company reported passing abandoned trenches, and nine minutes later A Company passed through another set of abandoned foxholes. The shelling of the Fapla positions had set more vehicles on fire, and at 06h48 an ammunition dump in the Fapla positions blew up.

The Unita infantry that had moved ahead of Charlie now began to drift back, suggesting that contact was imminent. The Ratel-90s of the armoured car squadron and the Olifants of E Squadron took up firing positions before continuing the advance in very short bounds through the still thickening bush. The Ratel-90s now came across vehicle tracks. A few minutes later one of the observers informed Charlie that there were four Fapla tanks on its left flank. This caused some confusion, because the objective was still some way ahead.

Fapla had by now at last reacted to Charlie's approach. About 07h32 16 Brigade reported that the South Africans were

(Continued on page 7)

## PORTUGAL'S DESPERATE EFFORTS TO KEEP ANGOLA

## The MPLA in war

(Continued from page 4)

When the MPLA started the second phase of the fight in eastern Angola in 1967, they picked the fruits of indoctrination during the first phase. With the soldiers, medics, nurses, technicians, agriculturists, and teachers were also sent to the front.

As to target areas, the MPLA concentrated on Cabinda, the southern Dembos and eastern Angola.

With its supply depot at Dolisie, near the border of Cabinda, it was common sense that the MPLA would start a front

there. The topography of Cabinda made infiltration difficult. Opposition from the local terrorist organisation, FLEC (**Fronte de Liberação do Enclave de Cabinda**) was also encountered. Despite this, groups of MPLA terrorists managed to stay inside Cabinda, though claims that they were in control of the enclave were regarded as exorbitant.

With regards to eastern Angola, a MPLA front in the area already existed in 1964. In September 1964, a month before Zambia's independence, Daniel Chipenda en Ciel da Cinceição was sent to Kaunda to obtain base

facilities, while Neto himself investigated the possibilities of opening an office in Dar Es Salaam. That was the start of the Agostinho Neto route from Dar Es Salaam through Lusaka and Santa Maria and Kalabo in western Zambia, by which MPLA units were supplied logistically on the Angolan eastern front.

The MPLA's first permanent base, Hanoi I, was established about 11 kilometres from the Zambian border, near Gago Coutinho. From here, medical and educational services were provided

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Cuban and Fapla officers saluting each other on an Angolan airfield

## Historical Account:

## Operation Moduler: The Attack on 16 Brigade, Part 1

*(Continued from page 6)*

about to attack with tanks. 16 Brigade-also began to redeploy their tanks to meet the impending attack. As soon as the situation was reasonably clear, the Operational Command Post ordered Tactical Group 2 to move up from the south to support 16 Brigade. The commander of Tactical Group 2 reacted remarkably promptly - the first vehicles of Tactical Group 2 were seen leaving the Viposto area at 07h52, moving towards the Hube source. Marais was warned by the Task Force head-

quarters that the Tactical Group might be in a position to intervene as early as 10h00.

The Cuban component of 16 Brigade's headquarters meanwhile began to withdraw southward with two tanks, while the Soviet advisers pulled back and called for helicopter extraction. Two helicopters were noticed in the area a little later.

Charlie continued advancing by short bounds. At 08h00 the Task Force head quarters confirmed that there were five tanks on Charlie's left. At 08h05 D Company re-

ported noise to its left and, soon afterwards, confirmed that there was Fapla troops and tanks to the left of Charlie. Some D Company men could hear the Fapla troops talking among themselves. Their intention was apparently to let the covering force pass before attacking the flank of the main body briefly and then withdrawing.

Marais manoeuvred a part of his force to deal with this enemy on his left flank swinging A Company and E Squadron round to face left. Concerned that the

*(Continued on page 9)*

Damaged Angolan Mi-17 Hip helicopter

**Link to this story:**

<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=669>

## From the Diary of Lieutenant Colonel Igor Anatolevich Zhdarkin

*(Continued from page 2)*

the area between the rivers Mianei and Colui.

The enemy has twice launched attacks against the 1st battalion. The first time was at 12.30 and the second time was at 14.00.

The point is that the 1st battalion is occupying the heights from which the enemy earlier on shelled Cuito-Cuanavale with 155-millimeter long-range guns. Therefore

the enemy is right now doing all he can to recapture these heights.

Around 15:00, the enemy began to shell us with time fuses. The air is full of exploding shit which doesn't land on the ground but showers fragments upon everyone below. This is something quite new!

The enemy once again attacked the 1st battalion. Total losses from all attacks - 2 men killed and 7 men wounded.

Nothing is known about the enemy's own losses.

At 16:30, a column from the 25th brigade reached us. They brought food products to our brigade and letters for us (Soviet advisors). As they were approaching us, the enemy began to shell them but everything finished well.

"The air is full of exploding shit which doesn't land on the ground but showers fragments upon everyone below. "

## PORTUGAL'S DESPERATE EFFORTS TO KEEP ANGOLA: The MPLA in war

*(Continued from page 6)*

to the local population, while provisioning gangs that operated in the area.

Later, Hanoi II was established more towards the west in Zone C. Don Barnett told how he, to-

gether with a group of about 40 MPLA supporters, walked to Hanoi II in 1968, a distance of 280 kilometres in 14 days. They had to be continually alert against Portuguese air attacks. As soon as a droning was heard, the warning

'Aviao!' was shouted and each and every one disappeared into the bush as best as they could. While he was there, Hanoi II was discovered by the Portuguese Air Force, and levelled to the ground. That was but

*(Continued on page 8)*

The Alouette III helicopter was extensively used by Portuguese as well as South African forces

## Uittreksel uit "Ag man dit 'WAS' lekker in die Army" - van Danie Matthee



Parades were an integral part of a recruit's training in the SADF

Gedurende basies het ek gereeld vergeet om my oorpak se boonste sak se knoop vas te maak. Dit het gereeld gebeur dat die Bombadier by 10 *Anti Aircraft* by Youngsfield tydens inspeksie die los (staal) knoop dan

af ruk en dan moet ek dit weer vaswerk. Ek het teen die tyd al moeg geword om die knoop elke keer vas te werk. Ek kry toe by die *medics* van die gare (steke) wat hulle gebruik om wonde mee toe te werk en

werk my sak se knoop met dit vas. Met ons volgende inspeksie los ek met opset my sak knoop los. Die Bombadier kom weer voor my tot stilstand en gryp my knoop soos gewoonlik vas en met 'n ruk probeer hy die staal knoop afruk. 'n Knoop wat vasgewerk is met nylon steke en sagte vingers werk nie saam nie. Die Bombadier land toe by die *medics* met die velle van sy vingers afgeruk. "AG SHAME BOMBADIER STEYN" Ek is nie jammer nie!

C Emmerson



## PORTUGAL'S DESPERATE EFFORTS TO KEEP ANGOLA The MPLA in war

(Continued from page 7)

one of many incidents of this war.

In the beginning of the nineteen-seventies, a leadership crisis disadvantaged the MPLA's war efforts badly. The fact that Daniel Chipenda (the military leader at the eastern

front) started opposing the authority of Agostinho Neto, crippled the movement's war efforts in eastern Angola. The important base, Ho Chi Minh, surrendered to the Portuguese. A prominent commander, Manuel Muti, crossed over to the Portuguese. It is rumoured that Agostinho Neto pulled

back to Brazzaville with about 800 loyal men. These disruptions, together with a successful counter-offensive by the Portuguese, served to limit operations in eastern Angola to sporadic mine and ambush incidents. (J. Marcum, "The Angolan Revolution", Volume II, p.214.)

## Historical Background: Terms of Alvor

(Continued from page 1)

nine months.

Article 54 states: "The FNLA, the MPLA and UNITA undertake to respect the property and legal interests of the Portuguese citizens who were resident in Angola". According to Article 55,

Portugal on the one hand, and the three liberation movements on the other hand, had undertaken to establish and maintain continued good relations of constructive cooperation in all areas. (English translations of the Alvor Agreement can be found, amongst oth-

ers, in Rona M. Fields, "The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement", Appendix B, pp. 243-252. Also compare E. Harsch and T. Thomas, "Angola. The hidden story of Washington's War", pp. 61-63.)

Link to this story:

<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1106>



Soviet-supplied Mi-8 helicopter taking off from an airfield

Historical Account:  
Operation Moduler: The Attack on 16 Brigade, Part 1

*(Continued from page 7)*

Fapla force might break away and move east to threaten his echelon, he also detached an anti-tank troop to move back to protect them. Some members of a reconnaissance team came up and gave Marais details of what the artillery observers had been able to identify in this Fapla position.

Major Andre Relief brought all three of his troops into line abreast as he swung his squad-

ron through 90 degrees. The Ratels and infantry of A Company integrated with the tanks and the combined force then advanced on the Fapla position. Contact came after the first fifty-metre bound; one troop fired at some infantry and a BTR-60 armoured personnel carrier. The first South African tank versus tank action since World War II followed shortly after. At 08h09, Lieutenant Hein 'Mieliepap' Fourie shot out a T-55, the first en-

emy tank to fall to a South African tank since 1945. Eight minutes later. Lieutenant Abrie 'Sirkusleeu' Strauss reported another tank shot out. They and the infantry then broke into this Fapla outpost. Major Andre Retief drew his remaining troop forward to enter the fight in support of the infantry.

*The Attack on 16 Brigade continues next week, with Part 2...*



Angolan T-55 tank similar to the one which was shot out by an Olifant tank on 9 November 1987

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**TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SADF AND SWATF!**

Write the names of the units represented by the flashes below each one.

*Find the answers in next week's issue!*

Last week's unit flashes:



**1 Parachute Battalion** was founded as a parachute training battalion for National Servicemen, located next to the old Tempe Airfield in Bloemfontein

The unit was originally founded and commanded by the legendary Colonel Jan Breytenbach, who was also founder of the SA Special Forces and 32 Battalion.



**2 South African Infantry Battalion** was a composite battalion located at Rooikop, Walvis Bay.

It also had an artillery battery (43 Bty) and armoured car squadron (D Sqn) both of which was attached permanently..

2 SAI was involved in incursions into Angola right from the start as part of Operation Savannah, in 1975



**31/201 Battalion** was formed as Combat Group Alpha in 1974, then renamed to 31 Battalion after

Operation Savannah. In 1980 the unit became 201 Battalion as part of the SWATF. It was finally renamed 31 Battalion again in 1989.

It was located at Omega Base in the West Caprivi before being relocated to South Africa after the war.



Members of 31/201 Battalion on patrol. Note the unique headgear and horizontal stripes for rank



### Schedule of Events

- 20 March 2011 — S.M.V.G Military Swap Meet, UK
- 21-23 March 2011 — Full Motion Video for Defense, USA
- 21-23 March 2011 — Defence Logistics Europe 2011, UK
- 21-23 March 2011 — 2nd Annual Non-Traditional Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance Summit, USA
- 21-23 March 2011 — 7th Military Antennas, USA
- 21-23 March 2011 — IDGA's Retrograde, RESET and Redistribution Summit, USA
  - 21-23 March 2011 — IDGA's 15th Battlefield Healthcare Series: Va/DoD Continuum of Care, USA
- 21-23 March 2011 — Air Surveillance and Reconnaissance 2011, UK
- 23-25 March 2011 — Future Artillery 2011, UK
- 26-27 March 2011 — 28th MSSA Gauteng Board Gaming & Wargaming Championships


## MARCH 2011

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

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
[www.veridical.co.za](http://www.veridical.co.za)




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Mark Raats has created this **SPECIAL EDITION** high quality 900mm x 600mm poster of his original artwork, "An Unpopular War", SPECIFICALLY and EXCLUSIVELY for the users of WarInAngola.com. This is the same artwork which has proven such a direct hit in the form of the complimentary "OUMAN" sticker we have been sending out to all SADF

Veterans, courtesy of Danie Matthee, with the kind permission and specific design provided by Mark. This high quality poster is now available for only **R300, plus R50 handling and postage** anywhere in South Africa. Postage to the rest of the world will be added accordingly. Please enquire first as to the cost thereof.



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
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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

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The War In Angola website ([www.warinangola.com](http://www.warinangola.com)) is dedicated to recreating and re-fighting the battles between the adversaries of the Angolan War (or Border War as it is also known), that is, the SADF and UNITA on the one side and the Soviet-supplied FAPLA, Cuba, and SWAPO on the other side. In order to recreate the battles as accurate as possible, a lot of research is required about the equipment, organisation, quality, uniforms, command, support and logistical structures behind the different forces.

There are two sides to the website: the gaming and recreation of the miniature battles; and the historical facts and research of the forces behind the battles.

The dividing line between the two sides is deliberately blurred in order to expose both sides to all the users, thereby promoting and exposing the wargaming and modeling hobby to the historically inclined and vice-versa.

Johan Schoeman

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## Last week's latest topics on the Forums

Link to the Forums:

<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=590>

### RE: Planning of Operation Moduler by George

Had a look at your call sign diagram for 61 Mech Bn Gp. My name is George Conradie, Battery Post Officer (BPO) at Sierra Battery (61 Mech Bn Gp) from Jan 1986 till Dec 1990. As I can Recall the BPO...

### RE: Bridge 14 by marwen

Howzit Brad, Long time no hear. Remember Tony Carter's Gun Crew "Bad Company"? We dropped our 5.5 in the Nhia River while trying to cross to do some sniping behind FAPLA's lines Regards, ...

### RE: "Zulu, Zulu Golf", by Arn 'Jim' Durand by Feetloose

Thanks Jim, I will keep my eyes peeled for the announcement.

### RE: "Zulu, Zulu Golf", by Arn 'Jim' Durand by Jim Hooper

Morning, Feetloose-- Zebra don't sell directly to the public, and won't be listing it on their

website until it's in the bookshops. But don't worry, there will be plenty of copies. Best, ...

### RE: "Zulu, Zulu Golf", by Arn 'Jim' Durand by Feetloose

Darn, can not wait for July. How do we "reserve" a copy ?

### RE: Weekends, Missions and other Actions by Sensi702

hi Mike, i do have various photos of ops hooper 1987-88 from 61 mech and 2ssb unfortunately i do not have the negs so not sure if you could use them. i was an ops medic that side nov87-april88. ...

### Weekends, Missions and other Actions by Mike Brink

Hi All. I am in the closing phases of completeing my book on the 75-88 angolan border war. A 101 tales of bush war mahem. I am looking for photos to illustrate the book and if anyone has a rele...

### RE: Planning of Operation

### Moduler by slide

Hi Guys, I think I was one of the gunners that went along with that G5. For the records the pamphlet projectiles were beige not blue ( see my pics, there is one with me and two mates sitting with a pi...

### RE: Background and early operations (1975 -1985) by TinusDK

Peter Stiff, in error, in The Silent War combined the detail and info of two operations and made it into one operation. These two operations were Operation Colosseum (1986) and Operation Firewood (198...

### "Zulu, Zulu Golf" by Arn 'Jim' Durand, by Jim Hooper

Johan-- I wanted to give you and the readers of [www.warinangola.com](http://www.warinangola.com) a heads-up on a new memoir of the Border War coming out this year. Arn 'Jim' Durand was one of my first mentors during the time ...