

WAR IN ANGOLA

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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

First support to the FNLA via Rundu

The sixteenth article on the prelude to the participation of the South African Defence Force in the Angolan Civil War:

Like Chipenda arrived more than a month before, so also did his commander of the Cuando-Cubango district, Ondinga-Ondinga, who arrived at Calai on 8 July 1975 and contacted the South African Defence Force in Rundu. He was accompanied by five white supporters and about 20 *flechas*, or Bushman soldiers. There were more of his followers at Mpupa, about 60 kilometres from Calai. According to an intercepted radio message there were about 300. These people were really refugees and Ondinga was looking for assistance. He asked for supplies and weapons and promised to fight SWAPO. Brigadier D. Schoeman, the commanding officer of 1 Military Area, stood sympathetic towards this request, especially due to the promises relating to SWAPO.

Some days later, on 11 July 1975, Pilisso, Chipenda's brother-in-law, also arrived at Mpupa with a request for help for the FNLA supporters.

According to him there were 150 men comprising of blacks, whites and Bushmen, but with only 15 rifles and insufficient ammunition. He envisaged that they could occupy posts at Calai, Mucusso and Dirico if they could obtain supplies. Pilisso also brought the upsetting news that the MPLA were busy driving the FNLA out of strategic centres in southern Angola.

In order to meet their need temporarily, the following were provided to them: two tonnes of food, medical supplies, and five G3 rifles with ammunition, two rockets and two hand grenades. The weapons had been confiscated from Portuguese refugees at Oshakati.

On 5 August 1975 Commandant P. du Preez, under the command of Brigadier Schoeman, made a appeal to Pretoria requesting weapons for the FNLA group at Mpupa. It was the crisis month of August 1975. SWAPO attacks had become more intense. Chief Elifas had been murdered. UNITA had disrupted labour at the Ruacana-

(Continued on page 2)

Featured Gallery: Operation Hooper 1987/88



The camo Ratel-90s of the AT Squadron of 32 Bn (Arno Casius)



The Ratel ZT3 anti-tank vehicles of the AT Squadron (Arno Casius)



Getting the Multiple Rocket Launcher ready to fire (Arno Casius)

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First support to the FNLA via Rundu



SWAPO guerrillas with a light supply vehicle

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"The first shipload of weapons purchased from overseas arrived at Matadi."



SWAPO (PLAN) guerrillas marching during a passing out parade

(Continued from page 1)

Calueque project which led to South African occupation of the terrain. The MPLA had attacked Oshikango. Thousands of refugees had started to stream across the border with stories of bloody clashes and chaotic conditions in the interior. The MPLA have been progressing rapidly in the south with their July, August offensive. Large quantities of Russian weapons were pouring into the country and

the possibility that the MPLA would take control on 11 November 1975 could not be excluded. This all contributed to a taxing atmosphere which caused anxiety and brought the realisation that something had to be done quickly to support the FNLA and UNITA, as they requested.

Minister P.W. Botha, who was visiting the border at that time, ordered that the FNLA should receive more help in order to withstand the pressure applied from

the MPLA. The Cabinet was informed of this later.

Commandant du Preez went to Nova Lisboa to negotiate with the FNLA leadership. There he learned of the critical stage that the situation had reached with the MPLA forces already approaching Nova Lisboa. He left a long distance radio behind for the purpose of communication.

In order to act on Minister Botha's order to pro-

Operational Instruction 8/75 was issued by Army HQ

vide more help to the FNLA, Operational Instruction 8/75 was issued by Army Headquarters on 28 August 1975. In their appraisal of the situation, the rapid advances the MPLA were making along the coast of central and southern Angola thanks to Russian and Cuban assistance were pointed out. It was further deemed unlikely that an MPLA regime would be friendly towards the RSA in future. Furthermore, the attitudes, promises of collaboration and appeals for assistance made by Savimbi and Chipenda, weighed heavily. Support of UNITA and the FNLA inferred the possibility of

a friendly neighbour. Therefore the commanding officer of 1 Military Area received the order to support the FNLA in southern Angola on a clandestine manner and to the extent that the FNLA would be capable of recapturing the cities in southern Angola from the MPLA. He was also instructed to act against SWAPO members opposite the South-West Africa/Namibia border.

Acting on the last instruction, Brigadier Schoeman launched several cross-border operations in the following months such as Karin II, Cubango Gallop, Hans I and II.

The operation through

which help was to be provided to the FNLA, was given the cover name of Operation Savannah. This name eventually included all the actions and activities of the South African Defence Force in support of the FNLA and UNITA. As a first positive result the following weapons were given to the FNLA: 525 machineguns with 1,100,000 bullets, 25 x 60 mm mortars with 5,000 mortar bombs, and 15,000 x 7.62 mm ammunition.

About the same time the first shipload weapons purchased from overseas by Lt.-Gen. van den Bergh with of the allotted R20 million, arrived at Matadi.

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Featured Equipment: The OZM-series and OZM3 anti-personnel mines

The **OZM series** of anti-personnel mines consists of a certain type of projectile (120mm mortar bomb or 122mm/152mm artillery shell), modified by the attachment of, in place of the nose-mounted impact fuse, a small box-shaped propellant charge (the UVK-1). This is connected by a thin metal tube to the fuse mounted at right-angles to the tail fins (or shell base). The fuse can be either the pressure, pull or electrical type, and performs two tasks—activation of the propellant charge and of the delayed-action system of the detonator. The OZM is usually buried in the earth,

nose down, with only the fuse lying above the mine and parallel to the ground. When the fuse is activated, the propellant projects the mine into the air between 1.5-2.5m, depending on size of the bomb or shell used, and simultaneously ignites the delayed-action system incorporated in the propellant charge-box to detonate the mine at the top of its jump. The amount of explosive charge contained varies with the type of projectile. The **OZM3 jumping mine** is unusual in that the hole in the ground in which it is placed acts as its outer pot.

The OZM3 consists of a steel cylinder with a thin tinplate base with a centrally placed key for a detonator well. On one side of the key is a raised threaded adaptor and on the other side are two electrical leads. Based on the UVK propellant system, it may be detonated by a trip-wire operated igniter or by command detonation. A flash caused by one ignition systems fires the propellant charge. The type of soil and the type of hole dug will govern the height the mine is thrown into the air. The charge throws metal, from an inner fragmentation shell, up to a radius of 45 m.



The ground had to be carefully probed for mines because the soft sand made it so easy to lay


From "Brassey's Infantry Weapons of the Warsaw Pact Armies", edited by J.I.H. Owen

Specifications

Country of Origin:	USSR			
Type:	120mm bomb	122mm shell	152mm shell	OZM3
Weight:	18.6kg (41pd)	24.5kg (54pd)	45.4kg	4.5kg (10pd)
Charge:	1.8kg (4pd) TNT	3.4kg (7.5pd) TNT	6.3kg (13.9pd) TNT	75gm (2.6oz) TNT
Body Material:	bomb	Artillery shell	Artillery shell	Metal

"The sandy soil of southern Angola did not lend itself to practical use of this jumping mine"

The OZM3 anti-personnel mine



Images from From "Brassey's Infantry Weapons of the Warsaw Pact Armies", edited by J.I.H. Owen



Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Zhdarkin, Part 26



Russian advisor getting water from a hand pump driven by SWAPO guerrillas (photo: © Igor Ignatovich)

"...their car suffered a direct hit by 155-millimetre shell."

This is the twenty-sixth part of a 50-part series taken from "**We did not see it even in Afghanistan**". Memoirs of a participant of the Angolan war (1986-1988)", by Lieutenant Colonel Igor Anatolevich Zhdarkin

For our part, we did something very stupid, by moving along a small river until we reached the crossing while it was still night in order to escape the bombardment. In fact, we went there to show off. Why? Because we knew that on that side of the river was the South African aircraft spotter who would now and then provide the coordinates enabling the bombardment to begin.

One evening Sasha Sergeev, the interpreter, came to me. Well then, he invited me to go to

the bridge. "Wait a minute while I take my sub-machinegun", I said. I set out for my dugout, but something told me not to go, a sort of inner gut feeling.

Well, I stood still for awhile and thought. I thought, "The God only knows! Something isn't right". I approached him. And he was already swearing – "One always has to wait for you"! But then I turned to him and said "I'm not going." He asked, "Why, Igor?" What could I say to answer him? To speak according to my inner voice, "I simply don't want to, that's all".

He looked at me attentively and said. "Then don't go". And he left alone.

They set off. On the

bridge, at first everything was good, they took our people across the river... But in the meantime, they sat in the dugouts – their car suffered a direct hit by 155-millimetre shell.

– What type of car?

– An «Emgesa» – a Brazilian car.

After returning from the bridge, Sasha came to me.

Oh hell! Do you know what happened?

"Well, what of it!"

Then he said: "You didn't go as if you had had a presentiment of something..."

– There was one man in our team there, his name was "Pasha" – a warrant officer (a service engineer). He had just spent

He had just spent two years in Afghanistan

two years in Afghanistan.

If he got drunk, he would simply shoot the Angolans between their legs. Overall, his was a classic performance. He would come out of his dugout carrying his sub-machinegun in one hand and shouting, "Antonio, come here quickly – there is something to do out there". If Antonio didn't carry out his orders, Pasha would shoot directly between his legs – without further ado.

And they all knew that he was a crack shot. He never actually hit anyone. Yet all Angolans ran past him in terror. As a result, if he felt it was necessary to do something right away, he always knew that it would be done.

[We somehow came to him to have a party. As long as I was in charge of the kitchen, I brought some food. I told him, "Pasha, we have nothing to drink!" Pasha answered, "There will be right away". I said, "The night outdoors? How will that be?"

He went out – shot from his Kalashnikov into the air: "Antonio – caporote (local liquor)!"

Antonio: "no, assessor".

"What a hell of «no!» go and find!"

And Antonio found and brought liquor and we had some drinks.]

How many times did I see when we would go to fetch water, we would go on a watercarrier, on

«Emgesa». We would arrive there, I sat and watched from above the water cistern while Pasha would give a burst of machinegun fire and the Angolans would begin to run. After all, they all knew Pasha. What kind of person was Pasha and they knew: once Pasha had spoken, there were no questions – they did everything and filled up everything.

For all that, the Angolans respected him and loved him very much: he was master at all trades, a real professional and also in case of necessity he defended Angolans with might and main!

To be continued next week in Part 27...



Russian advisors and SWAPO guerrillas posing on a T-34/65 tank (photo: © Igor Ignatovich)

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Historical Account: Operation Hooper: The second attack on Tumpo Part 2

Extract taken with the author's permission from: "War In Angola - The Final South African Phase", by Helmoed-Römer Heitman.

At 23h20 61 Mech reported themselves ready to move off, but that they were waiting for yet another tank that had dropped out. The force was now down to ten tanks and seventeen Ratel-90s.

At 00h10 on 1 March, 61 Mech reported that they were moving out of their forward assembly area. Another problem had, however, cropped up with the tanks:

five of them had unserviceable driver night periscopes, which greatly

hindered movement. The approach nevertheless went ahead, and by 01h50 the force had reached the point where the reserve was to drop off. The mine rollers had still not caught up, and heavy rain now greatly reduced visibility.

At 02h22 Muller again asked for the attack to be delayed until first light. Visibility had by now deteriorated to some fifty metres. In view of the various problems that had arisen, the poor light in particular. Colonel McLoughlin now agreed to Muller's persistent request. Given the altered circumstances, he also ordered the 3rd Regular Battalion to advance with the tanks, with the 5th Regu-

lar Battalion to follow behind them. 32 Battalion was to be held in reserve. He also stipulated that the attack should only go in if there were cloud cover.

The main force began moving again at 05h45, and reached the Lupire road at 07h20 after briefly losing its way and moving in north of the Dala instead of south. Les Rudman was meanwhile once again busy with a distraction operation, simulating the approach of a mechanised force from the south-east. His team did so very successfully, drawing Fapla's attention - and heavy and sustained artillery fire - while Mike Muller approached unobserved. The first enemy



South African Olifant tank and crew at the Army Battle School during an exercise

"BM-21s kept shooting at the advancing vehicles..."

The first enemy artillery fire only began falling at 07h30

artillery fire only began falling around Muller's force at 07h30. The 5th Regular Battalion was met at 08h27. They were not displaying the agreed recognition signs and were reluctant to join up, although this was completed by 08h45. Four BM-21 ripples had meanwhile gone in on '61 Koppie' at 08h40 to no effect, as the force was well clear of it. The gunners took an interest, however, and plotted the launchers for future reference.

Muller now regrouped his force and moved off south of the Dala. The abandoned Fapla first line defences were crossed at 09h00, and the force swung around

to move due west from there. An air warning at 09h55 cost only a few moments' delay, the aircraft flying past to the Chaminga source area. BM-21s kept shooting at the advancing vehicles but did not place any rockets nearby. A request from some tank commanders to engage BM-21s that they could see on the west bank was denied, because it would have revealed their location to the Fapla observers.

The movement went smoothly to the bush line, the tanks moving at walking speed and the 5th Regular Battalion deployed in line with them. The cloud cover was 7/8ths and very low,

which kept the danger of air interference to the minimum. Colonel McLoughlin now obtained General Meyer's consent that the force should not stop its movement on receiving air warnings as long as the cloud cover remained adequate. At 10h43 the force came across an abandoned outpost, where the 5th Regular Battalion dug in. Soon after, the force began to receive 120 mm mortar fire.

Mike Muller began to find the situation too quiet for his liking, for only the mortar fire gave any indication that Fapla was even aware of his force. He reported that Fapla

(Continued on page 8)

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Unimog-based ambulance used by the SA Medical Service

"WE'VE GOT A RUSSIAN!"



Puma helicopter doing its all-important work, either deploying stopper groups or CASEVAC

"The Mirages and Buccaneers roared overhead into heavy anti-aircraft fire..."

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The war between South Africa and the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) began in 1966, escalated sharply after the 1975 Communist take over of Angola and ended in 1989 when Pretoria granted Independence to Namibia. Among the South African Defence Force (SADF) and South West African Territory Force (SWATF) units which operated against SWAPO in its Angolan sanctuary, none was more successful than 32 Battalion. Conceived by the legendary Colonel Jan Breytenbach, "Three-two" was formed initially with soldiers of the Chipenda Brigade of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola

(FNLA) who had fled into South West Africa/ Namibia after their 1975 defeat by the Cuban-supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Originally trained by another of Breytenbach's creations, the Reconnaissance Commandos - the South African equivalent of the SAS - and operating almost exclusively inside Angola, 32 Bn finished the war with combat loses of 156, while inflicting over 7500 kills on the enemy.

Following the communist takeover of Angola in 1975, SWAPO was given free license by the new government to use former Portuguese bases near the southern border for logistics and jumping-off points into Namibia. As a result, the South African security

forces soon found themselves facing increasing numbers of well-armed insurgents along a 400-mile open, heavily bushed border. Unwilling to accept a purely defensive posture, the SADF went on the offensive with punitive and pre-emptive strikes into Angola against SWAPO and FAPLA, the Angolan army that supported it.

The first major deployment of South African troops was Operation Reindeer, a surgical airborne assault against Cassinga, SWAPO's operational headquarters 150 miles inside Angola. Taken completely by surprise, SWAPO lost hundreds of trained insurgents against five South African paratroopers killed. Other operations followed, in which millions of dollars of So-

Millions of dollars of Soviet-supplied equipment was destroyed

viet-supplied equipment was destroyed or captured and thousands of guerillas killed. Though it was known that both SWAPO and FAPLA enjoyed the support of Soviet advisers, no Soviets had come face to face with the South Africans. None, that is, until Operation Protea.

Protea, one of the biggest cross-border ops of the war, blitzkrieged into Communist Angola from SWA/Namibia on 21 August 1981. Included in the OPLAN was Ongiva, an important SWAPO logistics and staging base protected by a FAPLA brigade. As SADF mechanized infantry units advanced on Ongiva from the south,

the 110 men of Charlie Company, 32 Bn, under command of 23-year-old First Lieutenant Thinus van Staden had already infiltrated to block the enemy's escape route.

"There were two parallel roads coming out of the town," Commandant (LtCol) Van Staden recalled in an interview thirteen years later, "one with a tarred surface, the other just a dirt track, and I deployed my men between them about six clicks to the north." At 0700 the South African Air Force opened the attack, giving Charlie Company a ringside seat as the Mirages and Buccaneers roared overhead into heavy anti-aircraft fire. They saw one Mi-

rage hit with a SA-7, but it survived and turned for home, trailing smoke.

By 1300 hours hundreds of refugees began streaming up the dirt track. A few FAPLA soldiers had been culled from the civilians and taken prisoner when the sounds of vehicles were heard. Van Staden advised headquarters by radio, but was told it was captured equipment being brought out of Ongiva by South African military intelligence personnel. When the first vehicles hove into sight Van Staden was reassured by the sight of two Land Rovers, one white, the other blue, followed

(Continued on page 7)



Mirage F1 taking off to strike at a designated target

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Uittreksel uit "Ag man dit 'WAS' lekker in die Army" - van Danie Matthee

Ons moes splinter nuwe voertuie bestaande uit Samil Guntrekkers en Mazda B2000 bakkies vanaf Pretoria na Grootfontein toe neem. Dit was nogal 'n groot konvooi en dit het ons 'n paar dae geneem om ons bestemming te bereik. In Suid-Wes het ons in Windhoek oornag. Ons was teen die tyd al gatvol vir ratpacks en was lus vir 'n stukkie vleis. Ek maak ons Luitenant toe wakker en laat hom weet dat ons een van die bakkies gaan vat om vleis te gaan soek. Hy sê toe ons moet doen wat ons moet maar hy weet van niks nie en ons moet asseblief net uit die dorp bly. Ek en

drie ander troepe gryp toe een van die bakkies en is in die veld in om hase te jag. Ons sit toe 'n haas agterna en ek probeer my bes om agter op die bakkie staande te bly om die haas te skiet terwyl die drywer soos 'n paloeka bestuur. Die volgende oomblik slaan hy 'n gat en die bakkie keer om. Gelukkig vir ons het niemand seer gekry nie maar die

bakkie was so te sê heeltemal afgeskryf met 'n gebarste band ook nog. Ons glip toe terug kamp toe, sonder enige vleis, met die beskadigde bakkie. Ek maak die Luitenant wakker om hom die slegte nuus te vertel. Hy dog eers ons maak 'n grap en vra waar die vleis is. Ek sê toe vir hom hy moet nie stres nie want ek sal 'n plan maak met die bakkie. Die volgende

oggend vroeg, voor die konfooi vertrek, ry ek vooruit en ry van die

pad af sodat dit lyk of die ongeluk gebeur het in die konfooi op pad Grootfontein toe. Die konfooi stop toe op die plek waar die bakkie langs die pad staan en ons laat weet die Transport Offisier in Windhoek dat een van die bakkies in die konfooi se wiel gebars het en gerol het. Almal in die konfooi het mooi saam gespeel en die waarheid het nooit uitgekom nie en ons moes maar tevrede wees met ratpacks vir die res van die pad tot in Grootfontein.


Korporaal P Ferreira

1982 tot
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"WE'VE GOT A RUSSIAN!"

(Continued from page 6)

by a column of heavy Soviet-made trucks.

But something was wrong.

Within the SADF only 32 Bn and the Reconnaissance Commandos wore camouflage uniforms, rather than the standard brown "nutria" battle dress. The troops Van Staden observed in the Land Rovers and other vehicles, however, were neither "Recces" nor 32 Bn soldiers, yet all were dressed in camouflage-pattern battle dress. He relayed the information to his tactical headquarters, but was told not to worry. "Just show them where to park," he was told laconically.

"I decided they had to have a better picture of the situation than me," Van Staden said a little ruefully, "so I stepped into the middle of the road with my hand out and pointed to the left, indicating where they should park. The Land Rovers stopped, and the people got out and began directing the rest of the trucks to pull off and stop under the trees."

Something else was wrong. Although the South Africans had a number of mixed black and white units, Van Staden was acutely aware that there were no whites among the disembarking troops. At that point his sergeant eased up to him and whispered: "They're FAPLA!" The enemy had mistaken

Van Staden's black troops for FAPLA soldiers with Cuban or Soviet advisers. Another radio call to HQ that, "We've got big problems here," brought the order to withdraw.

Charlie Company moved fast to the west, and once they were clear Van Staden radioed for an airstrike from a flight of Impala ground-support fighter-bombers. The flight leader advised him to mark his position with yellow smoke and mark the enemy position with white phosphorus mortar rounds. Van Staden complied, but when the Impalas arrived, their 30mm cannons were empty.

Continued next week, in Part 2...

"His
sergeant
eased up to
him and
whispered:
'They're
FAPLA!'"



White phosphorous rounds make for ideal target indication because of its distinctive white smoke

The second attack on Tumpo Part 2



UNITA instructor showing how to use a SA-7 Surface-to-Air Missile

"One MiG-23 was hit by a missile and crashed near Longa."

Link to this story:

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High Explosive round fired by an Eland-90 armoured car is highly effective

(Continued from page 5)

must either have withdrawn or were waiting to launch a counter-attack. Dust and smoke on the west bank suggested to him that the Fapla artillery would soon be coming into action against him.

Distinctly unhappy about the immediate situation, Muller slowed down to advance by bounds of 100 metres, and later reduced it to only 20 metres at a time. Several MiGs attacked at 11h25, but bombed some Fapla positions in error and drew heavy 23 mm fire, which warned the South Africans that there were many of these dangerous guns about. Tim Rudman counted at least nine.

Muller remained stopped for a short while after the air attack, to give one of the tanks pushing mine rollers time to cool down.

He was at that point directly north-east of the confluence of the Cuito and the Tumpo, and had a good view of the west bank of the Cuito, where he could see a large number of vehicles, a radar system, some BM-21s and some tanks, all of which he duly reported to the artillery.

The MiGs returned at 11h45, but Muller kept moving forward using what cover there was. The fighters attacked at 11h50 without any result except to draw fire from both Unita and Fapla. One MiG-23 was hit by a missile and crashed near Longa. According to Unita, this aircraft was hit by a SAM fired by 13 Brigade, although the South Africans on the scene were sure that it had been hit by a Stinger.

Fapla at last reacted at 12h00, when between eight and twelve 23 mm

guns opened fire on the advancing force. Muller swung his force south towards the enemy positions, and the forward observer called for fire on the 23mm guns. The tanks and Ratel-90s delivered speculative fire as they advanced. At 12h20 the force began entering more open terrain, and stopped for a while to wait for the MiGs to leave the area.


Colonel McLoughlin now instructed Muller to move 32 Battalion up to the forward assembly area.

Muller began moving again at 12h50, while the artillery engaged targets on the west bank before switching its attention to the 23 mm guns at 13h10.

At 13h15 the leading elements drew indirect fire and some direct fire from the left flank.

Continued next week, in Part 3..

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This past week, "Somewhere on the Border..."

A police vehicle detonated a mine in SWA on **7 January 1972**, seriously injuring eight policemen. Another mine is discovered only 2 metres away and safely lifted.

During the election of the Owambo Board from **13 to 17 January 1975**, the voting percentage was 55%, despite a SWAPO boycott.

On **7 January 1976**, realising that the SADF were going to withdraw, FAPLA put plans for an offensive in southern Angola in motion.

On **8 January 1976**, the French and British called for a ceasefire in Angola, withdrawal of all foreign forces, and the cessation of weapon supply to prevent further bloodshed and destruction. Belgium

requested that foreign interference in Angola be stopped. West-Germany also expressed its concern over foreign interference in Angola.

On **9 January 1976**, the then Chairman of the OAU, President Idi Amin, condemned any force in Angola for killing Angolans.

The first official announcement about Cuban involvement in Angola was made on **9 January 1976** by the Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina.

On **10 January 1976**, the OAU's held their first open meeting of the Summit at the Hilton Hotel, Addis Abeba.

Bob Denard's first French mercenaries,

calling themselves the "Hoods", after the legendary Robin Hood, arrived at Kinshasa on **10 January 1976**.

During a closed meeting of the OAU on **11 January 1976**, the motion to acknowledge the MPLA as the valid government of Angola was submitted.

During the OAU's Summit in Addis Abeba on **11 January 1976**, three South African prisoners of war captured on the Orange Front In Angola were displayed to the press.

A representative of the FNLA/UNITA coalition had placed the number of Russians in Angola on **11 January 1976** at 700.

A UNITA representative put the number of Cu-

bans in Angola at 11,000 by **11 January 1976**.

The OUA's motion to acknowledge the MPLA is passed by 23 to 22 votes on **12 January 1976**, the final deciding vote cast by the Chairman, President Idi Amin

On **13 January 1976**, Task Force Zulu withdrew to positions where UNITA could still be supported but with the intention of retiring south of the Queve River during the night

On **8 January 1977**, 32 Battalion was upgraded to a Battalion Group comprising of 7 companies and a headquarters.

On **13 January 1988** a group of SWAPO insurgents rocketed Oshakati, killing two civilians.



TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SADF AND SWATF!

Write the names of the units represented by the flashes below each one.

Find the answers in next week's issue!

Last week's unit flashes:



The **South African Irish Regiment (SAIR)** was founded in Johannesburg

during September 1914. It saw action against the Germans in South West Africa, German East Africa, North Africa in the Western Desert. In 1946 it was reformed as the 22nd Field Regiment, SAA (SA IRISH), until 1960 when it reverted back to being an Infantry Regiment with the original name. It saw active duty in Angola and the Border war.



The **Witwatersrand Rifles** was established in Germiston in 1903 by merging the Railway Pio-

neer Regiment and the Rand Rifles. It served in Damaraland and in the north of German South West Africa in 1914-1915 and served with Regiment Botha in Egypt in 1942, and with Regiment de la Rey in the Apennines in 1945. From 1976 to 1986 the unit was involved in the Border War. In 1981 it converted to mechanised infantry.



Sector 70 was established as the headquarters of one of the 7 geographical areas

within South-West Africa used by the SADF to control and coordinate military operations. Sector 70 encompassed East Caprivi, covering the Zambian land border from the Cuando to the Zambezi River, and the riverine border with Zambia along the Zambezi to its Cuando confluence. Headquarters was at Katima Mulilo with 701 Battalion.

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SA Navy Marines on a river patrol in Sector 70

Schedule of Events


- 17-18 January 2012 — 11th Annual Airborne Early Warning and Battle Management 2012
- 17-18 January 2012 — Integrated Missile Defense Systems
- 19 January 2012 — SA Military History Society Johannesburg: The Boer Lieutenant's War: Battle of Talana 1899; and The Invasion of Britannia, 43 AD
- 19 January 2012 — SA Military History Society Durban: The Giant Leipheim; and Zulu Military Systems
- 19 January 2012 — SA Military History Society Cape Town: An overview and history of the Cape Coastal Defences; and The ordnance, B.L. 9.2-inch Mk X gun on Mk VII and IX mounting and the three 9.2-inch Coastal Defence Batteries of the Cape Peninsula (Illustrated)

JANUARY 2012

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

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
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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

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 E-mail: info@warinangola.com

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The War In Angola website (www.warinangola.com) is dedicated to recreating and re-fighting the battles between the adversaries of the Angolan War (or Border War as it is also known), that is, the SADF and UNITA on the one side and the Soviet-supplied FAPLA, Cuba, and SWAPO on the other side. In order to recreate the battles as accurate as possible, a lot of research is required about the equipment, organisation, quality, uniforms, command, support and logistical structures behind the different forces.

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Johan Schoeman

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Last week's latest topics on the Forums

Link to the Forums:

<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=590>

RE: 2 Special Service Battalion by Need2Know (guest)

Thank you for the link Johan, Appreciate it! So this was a armour regiment. How easy was it in the 1980's to transfer between regiments? Lets say from this armour regiment to other regiments? ...

RE: Engineers in Oshakati by ammazulu (guest)

Happy 2012

RE: 14 Light Artillery Regiment by Tjoops

PLEASE PLEASE forgive me, again the age played it's mistakes on me! It is NOT 14 Light Regiment (Which was in fact fact an "berede" horseback regiment according to Wikipedia! I was in fact in 18 Li...

RE: 2 Special Service Battalion by johansamin

I also don't have much on 2 SSB, other than what is here: <http://www.warinangola.com/>

Default.aspx?tabid=1239&Parameter=65 I do have a bit more on 1 SSB, which is here: <http://www.warinangola.com/>...

RE: 14 Light Artillery Regiment by Tjoops

Hi Johan, Yeah, I can't really remember ALL the details, but found a fantastic write-up on Wikipedia on 44 Parachute Brigade. I was at Cuito in 1988, got shot to shit, as you mentioned, still ...

RE: 14 Light Artillery Regiment by johansamin

Hi, Deon... Great to hear from you! I was aware of a 120mm Battery deployed between me and Cuito during Packer but had NO IDEA who they were... even though as OPO I even had the opportunity...

14 Light Artillery Regiment by Tjoops

Hi, I was in 44 Parachute Brigade and was in 14 Light Artillery

Regiment. We were rather VERY active outside Cuito, laying no more than 1500m from the town, doing daily bombing of the town with ou...

2 Special Service Battalion by Need2Know (guest)

Where can i find more info on "2 Special Service Battalion, which was based in the town of Zeerust" Anyhelp would be appreciated.

RE: Engineers in Oshakati by johansamin

Haai, Chris. Nee, daar was nie 'n balkie vir elke Operasie nie. Al balkies wat ons maar gedra het was ons Korps balkie wat onder die Eenheidsteken op ons Beret gesit het, met ander woorde, groe...

RE: 4 SAI - OPs Modular 87 by Sean Wilson

Hi Philip, I am now based in Perth and have been for over ten years.