

# WAR IN ANGOLA

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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

## Operation Olyfhout

Extract taken with the author's permission from: "32 Battalion - The Inside Story of South Africa's Elite Fighting Unit", by Piet Nortje.

For the first time in many years, patrols were introduced in the Olukula area, 11 km south of Beacon 36, in January 1982. Largely thanks to Project Spiderweb, the area had been quiet for some time, and perhaps the platoon from 8 SA Infantry had grown complacent, as an attack by SWAPO on 27 January, which left three South Africans dead, took them totally by surprise.

Intelligence officers were convinced that the attack was the work of SWAPO's Far East detachment, which had infiltrated from north of Beacon 36. Both UNITA and air reconnaissance confirmed a plentiful supply of water at Chana Chanadenge, 30 km north of the beacon, and UNITA also reported a possible SWAPO base close by, with another 45 km south of Ionde.

On 17 February, 32 Battalion's entire reconnaissance wing, divided into eight teams, set off from Omauni in a vehicle convoy, carrying both diesel and aviation fuel in anticipation of an attack, to try to locate the bases. Five days later, an early morning patrol made contact with a small group of SWAPO near Ionde, killing one and wounding another. For the next ten days of Olyfhout (olive wood), no further enemy presence was detected, and the morning of 27 February found the convoy at Chana Mocapo awaiting re-supply.

In accordance with standard operating procedure, the vehicles were drawn into a laager and camouflaged, with Captain Willem Ratte's command vehicle 111 the centre. Sergeant Phil Smit, leader of Team 8, flew out on one of the re-supply helicopters to be with his wife, who was due to have a baby. The rest of the group remained in position to wait for nightfall, but at 18h00 two Impala strike aircraft passed overhead on patrol - not an unusual sight in the area, except that some of the

*(Continued on page 2)*

### Featured Gallery:



*Captured 76mm gun drawn by a SAMIL*



*UNITA put captured FAPLA guns and BM-21 MRLs to good use*



*UNITA's indefatigable leader, Dr. Jonas Savimbi*

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- Featured Equipment: The No. 8 anti-tank mine
- Operation Displace: The last battle, Part 2
- The English-Afrikaans thing in the SADF, Part 4
- Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Zhdarkin Part 32

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## A South African liaison officer at Serpa Pinto



SWAPO cadres advancing through the bush

### Link to this story:

<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1278>

"Screams of the injured and the roaring after-burners of the jets told me I was in serious trouble!"

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SWAPO dead are searched by members of 32 Battalion

*The twenty-first article on the prelude to the participation of the South African Defence Force in the Angolan Civil War:*

The choice for this post fell on Cmdt. W.S. van der Waals. He previously had spent four years with the South African Consulate in Luanda. He could speak Portuguese fluently and knew the country's inhabitants well.

His duties as liaison officer were varied, and as the war developed, it became more important. He had to personally manage the normal liaison between Brig. Schoeman and UNITA's military headquarters and Dr. Savimbi. he also

had to assist UNIT with planning. One of his first tasks was the establishment of a training base for UNITA soldiers.

Two non-commissioned officers left Rundu with Cmdt. van der Waals for Silva Porto on 24 September 1975: Warrant Officer H.A. (Spider) Hattingh as radio operator, and Sergeant C.J. Maree as technician. The next day saw the arrival of Brig. Schoeman, who was the commanding officer of 1 Military Area, Brig. W. Black, Director of Operations at Chief of Staff, Col. J. Moolman, the commanding officer of 1 Air Component, and Maj. C.P. Upton, a staff officer of 1

Military Area, at Silva Porto. Issues with the UNITA headquarters were finalised during this occasion.

Amongst other things at Porto Silva, it was decided on 26 September 1975 that the training base should be established at Capolo, 60 kilometres south of Silva Porto. The very next day Cmdt. van der Waals left with Dr. Savimbi to inspect the place. It was originally a prison or a penal colony (*colonia penal*) from the Portuguese era. It had an airfield with a earthen runway. At that stage there were 700 UNITA soldiers at the base.

## Operation Olyfhout

*(Continued from page 1)*

ground troops noted afterwards that they seemed to be in attack mode.

They were - but even as the flight leader opened fire on the laager with his 30-mm gun, Sergeant Mark Craig could not comprehend what was going on, recording afterwards: 'My first thought was that this isn't happening, but screams of the injured and the roaring after-burners of the jets as they pulled told me I was in serious trouble.'

There was smoke and fire everywhere. Captain Ratte's command vehicle tool the brunt of the attack, but all around drums of fuel were exploding and being thrown high into the air. No one on the ground could

communicate with the aircraft, but fortunately the second pilot had already realised that the attack was a mistake, and did not launch his rockets. The damage, however, was done. Rifleman S Haefeni took a 30-mm round in the chest, and 17 men were wounded. One of the drivers, a National Serviceman, was badly burned but survived. The Bushman tracker was seriously injured by shrapnel. As team medic Corporal Robcrt Clifford worked on the wounded, Captain Ratte emerged from the inferno in the centre of the circle. There was blood on his face, his eyeglasses were shattered and he seemed disoriented, but refused medical treatment until all the other injured had been attended to.

Drums were still exploding, showering the men with burning fuel, and a column of thick black smoke reached high into the sky. The two Puma helicopters that had brought supplies earlier returned to evacuate the wounded. Ratte refused to climb aboard until one of the pilots, who outranked him, ordered him to do so. Lieutenants Jim Savory and Charlie Loxton and Sergeant Craig directed the clean-up operation. Days later the damaged vehicles were still smouldering, but the group, their numbers severely depleted and sitting ducks for any SWAPO in the area, was refused permission to withdraw from the area and told to wait until recovery vehicles arrived.

*(Continued on page 7)*

## Featured Equipment: The TMD-B and TMD-44 anti-tank mines

The well tried TMD-B wooden anti-tank mine (very similar to the Czech PT-Mi-D and the Soviet TMD-44) is housed in an almost square box with a canvas handle on one side and a lid consisting of three short planks set side by side in the centre. These planks form the pressure-plate and the centre plank is hinged to allow the MV-5 pressure-fuse to be inserted in the MD-2 detonator. When this has been done, the centre plank is locked in place by a narrow slat pushed through a groove in the ends of all three planks, Inside the box the main charge can consist of 5 kg to 7 kg of amatol,

dynammon, ammonite, TNT, picric acid, or others. The booster-charge is usually a 200 gm block of TNT. All specifications of the TMD-B can vary, as the simple design allows this mine to be constructed in the field as well as industrially, but the force required to detonate the mine is usually about 200kg. The TMD-B was employed by the Red Army in the later stages of World War II and was one of several used by the Koreans.

The TMD-44 is an improvement on the TMD-B wooden mine, but adopts similar operating principles. It is

essentially simply the TMD-B mine with the central hinged board replaced with a Bakelite fuse cap, this solved the disarming issue with the earlier TMD-B. It can be booby-trapped and converted to an anti-personnel mine.

From *"Brassey's Infantry Weapons of the Warsaw Pact Armies"*, edited by J.I.H. Owen; and Wikipedia

For more detailed information on the TMD-B and TMD-44, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TMD-44>



Civilian vehicle devastated by an anti-tank mine laid by SWAPO infiltrators

### Specifications

Country of Origin:	USSR
Length:	320 mm (12.6 in)
Width:	280 mm (11.02 in)
Height:	140 mm (5.51 in)
Weight:	7.7kg (17 lb)
Body Material:	Wood
Charge:	Amatol, dynammon, ammonite, TNT, picric acid, or others
Detonator Mechanism:	Pressure fuse inserted into detonator

"This mine can be constructed in the field as well as industrially"

## The TMD-44 anti-tank mine




Image from *"Brassey's Infantry Weapons of the Warsaw Pact Armies"*, edited by J.I.H. Owen

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## Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Zhdarkin, Part 30



Russian advisors posing somewhere in Angola

“The others received decorations while he received nothing...”

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“Order of the Red Star”, a Military Order given to Soviet army or navy personnel for “exceptional service in the cause of the defense of the Soviet Union in both war and peace”

This is the thirty-first part of a 52-part series taken from “**We did not see it even in Afghanistan**. Memoirs of a participant of the Angolan war (1986-1988)”, by Lieutenant Colonel Igor Anatolevich Zhdarkin

I had a similar experience with my own decorations. The Chief Advisor of our brigade recommended me for the decoration, “Order of the Red Star” – nothing! Then he recommended me for the medal, “For Combat Merits” – it too was unsuccessful. Only then, thanks to Belyukin Viktor Aleksandrovich, our Chief Interpreter in Luanda, did I receive this medal.

Petro Ivanovskiy also did not receive his decorations. He was recom-

mended for the “Order of the Red Star” and then for the medal, “For Combat Merits.” No result at all!

It was the same with Slava Barabulya: they recommended him several times for this medal, and again, only thanks to Belyukin Viktor Aleksandrovich, he finally received it.

These obstacles existed because General Gusev, the Chief Military Advisor to the Minister of Defence of Angola, cut to pieces any lists of decorations referring to the interpreters. If it concerned a young lieutenant, an interpreter, then it would mean that they were not worthy of decorations, even though they were only boys who had been on active mili-

tary operations, had sat through sieges, had been without food and had narrowly missed getting seriously sick. And his point of view was his alone.

Although there were cases when people managed to get their decorations. We had one such interpreter, Shkarinenko – a young boy. He also served in a military district, participated in combat actions.

They flew in a helicopter that was subsequently shot down. Two Soviet advisors were with him, as well as SWAPO fighters and Angolans. When the helicopter was shot down, it began to fall. When they were trying to land, some Angolans jumped out. Of course, all those who jumped out

Those who jumped out were already badly smashed up

were already badly smashed up. The rest did not jump out and just fell. Everybody suffered trauma and injury but, thank God, remained alive. Both advisors received decorations. They were both in fact guys with two years service in the war.

Well, these same advisors, turning to the boy in his capacity as interpreter, said, “Sasha, we are going to recommend you for a medal – maybe we’ll succeed. After all, we’re a couple of lieutenant colonels while you are only a lieutenant. In fact, he had become a lieutenant by completing a civil institution of higher education, followed by serving two years as an officer.

They recommended him for a medal. Thereupon, Shkarinenko arrived in Luanda, and there he was just told to fuck off. They said, “What? Medal for interpreter? And what type of heroic deed exactly did he accomplish?”

What type of heroic deed? ... He flew in this helicopter, fell down in this same helicopter – the same as all the others who survived. The others received decorations, while he received nothing, although, by all accounts, they should have given him a medal already long ago. He had stayed two years far away in the jungle; but because he did not serve at headquarters – he was not remembered.

And why? They (the senior officers) received decorations, and thank God, justifiably, but he received no medals at all, nothing.

Shkarinenko thereupon became angry and immediately went to headquarters (that is, to Gusev) and made a scene. He was after all serving for only two years and had nothing to lose (after Angola he was supposed to be retired). But here he lost his temper although he was known as reserved, modest and even shy.

... As a result, they gave him a medal, thank God, as far as I know, even a medal “For bravery”.

*To be continued next week in Part 32...*

## Operation Displace: The last battle...

Extract taken with the author's permission from: "War In Angola - The Final South African Phase", by Helmoed-Römer Heitman.

Colonel Migo Delpont, commander of 32 Battalion, flew in to take command of the task force organised to cover the installations at Calueque. Its most powerful element was 61 Mech, which had by now arrived in full strength, including its tank squadron. Other forces at his disposal included four infantry companies and the support company of 32 Battalion, several of its reconnaissance teams and one company each of 202 and 701 Battalions. His artillery

comprised one battery each of G-5s, 127 mm multiple rocket launchers and 120 mm mortars and a SWATF battery of 140 mm G-2s (5.5 guns).

The available intelligence at this point suggested strongly that the Cubans intended to advance southwards. Whether they would be content with pushing the South Africans away from Calueque and across the river by advancing ever nearer, or whether they intended to attack them, was far from clear - Castro was badly in need of something that could be represented as a victory and had been making some very aggressive noises.

Considering the situation and the considerable

disparity between his force and that opposite him, Delpont decided on an artillery strike to disrupt the Cuban force before it could move out to attack. He also decided to deploy 61 Mech across the Cunene to deal with any Cuban force that might attempt to attack the guns. While he waited for his plan to be approved, he ordered 25 Field Squadron to build earth ramps up to the heavy vehicle bridge at Calueque which had never been completed. This would enable him to send 61 Mech over the river there rather than at Ruacana, where any crossing would be expected to take place. The ramps were built at night and camouflaged during the day.



Olfant tanks in action at the Army Battle School during an exercise

"This force was no match for tanks and soon broke contact and withdrew"

### A combined Cuban and Fapla force moved out

On 24 June, meanwhile, a combined Cuban and Fapla force moved out of Xangongo to reoccupy Cuamato. They clashed with a South African screening force north of Cuamato. This force, a company of 201 Battalion reinforced with a platoon from 8 SAI, two troops of Ratcl-90s and an 81mm mortar section, was no match for tanks and soon broke contact and withdrew, not before losing two Buffels. Their brief resistance served its purpose, however, and the Cuban Fapla force did not continue to Cuamato. Reorganised, the 201 Battalion force deployed at Cuamato on 25 June to guard against reoccupation by Fapla.

Once the operation had been approved, 26 June was chosen as D-Day.

32 Battalion meanwhile organised platoon-strength and smaller protection forces for the forward observation officers who would control the fire. They were then inserted and infiltrated to the selected observation posts. Major Pierre Franken moved with Team 2 to a position near Techipa, from where he could bring fire on to the Cuban headquarters.

Major Hannes Nortmann had been called back from the Dala River with his missile-armed Ratels to refit at Rundu. On 25 June he was ordered to

be at Ruacana with his missile troop by 12h00 on 26 June. He set off with four missile - ZT-3 - Ratels, a command Ratel and a single Ratel-90 to replace the command vehicle if it were 'acquired' by the battalion headquarters.

At Ruacana Nortmann was given a five-minute briefing by the intelligence officer and spent five minutes with Colonel Delpont. Then he set off to catch up with 61 Mech which had deployed about thirty kilometres from Techipa to ambush any Cuban force that might move out to attack the guns when they began firing. At the front he lost his command Ratel,



South African G-5 155mm gun in action at the Army Battle School

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(Continued on page 7)

## The English-Afrikaans thing in the SADF, Part 3



South African soldier using the FN-MAG light machinegun

"I'm never going to survive this [opfok], I know it ..."

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SAAF Impala waiting to take off at an Air Force base

From the WarBlogs ([www.warblogs.co.za](http://www.warblogs.co.za)), written by: The Ancient Armourer

"Boet." A very tall, soft-spoken Afrikaner in the corner... "Kom sit by ons. Ék's bly jy's terug. Ek dink jy's baie dapper." So simply but kindly put. He stands up, walks across and shakes my hand. I barely reach his chest. He must be at least 1,9m tall.

"Ek's Jaarsie. Jaarsie van Jaarsveld."

"Ek's Phillip Vietri," I say in my heavily accented Afrikaans. "Julle ouens sal moet my hulp Afrikaans leer om te goed kan praat." Or some such monstrosity of grammar.

"Toe maar, boet, hier sal jy baie gou leer. Dis mos die army, dié." The

other Afrikaans guys laugh.

Not much need for comment here. The next is taken from the account of my first 05:00 PT session. I was a 56 Kg weakling at the time:

I hold out for 35 [of the 45] minutes. Then I fall out, hurk, bowed over, lungs burning, desperately gasping for breath. The PTI brings the squad to a halt.

"En jy, jou miserabele, klein fokken bliksem?" he asks. "Staan op, troep! Staan op, sê ek!" He walks up to me, places his [foot] in my lower back and shoves. I go sprawling. In a flash, Jaarsie is out of the squad, standing to attention in front of the PTI.

"Korporaal, gee hierdie man asseblief 'n

blaaskans. Hy was gister nog G5."

"Troep, dis hy wat gevra het om G1 te word. Nou moet hy homself soos een gedra. Gaan terug en staan op jou fokken plek...Jy," the PTI continues, addressing me, "Gaan sit 'n rukkie langs die veld. Sodra ek met hierdie ander klaar is, gaan ek vir jou 'n opfok gee." ... Ten minutes later, the others have finished. They are told to sit in their squads at the side of the field.

"Troep, kom hier!" he calls to me. I stand up, jog miserably towards him. I'm never going to survive this [opfok], I know it ... Suddenly I become aware that there's not just one of me standing in front of the PTI, but eight. My

## My buddies are right behind me

buddies are right behind me.

"Korporaal," says one of them, I can't remember who it was. "As u hierdie man nou 'n opfok gee, wil ons dit saam met hom doen. Hy's ons maat, en ons wil hom ondersteun..." [The PTI] pauses for a moment.

"Ok. As julle regtig so fokken mal is. Val in." It's only our first day of Basics, so the opfok isn't more than about 30 minutes. How I get through it I don't know to this day, except that there are seven other guys doing it with me, encouraging and supporting, keeping me going. We run back, loopas, singing "We ain't gonna run no more".

Fat chance! My arms are looped around the shoulders of two of the guys who have done the opfok with me. God, the bungalow is a welcome sight! The shower water is hot today. And I have survived my first opfok!

The third short extract shows how my Afrikaans buddies regarded me, and was one of the most heartening moments in what was for me, wuss as I was then, a crucifying six weeks:

Friday [afternoon] of the first week was a bad session for me. As we tree uit back up at the bungalow following the PT session, myself as usual strung about two of my mates, one of the

English-speaking ouens shouts, "Why do you guys even bother with him? He's such a weakling," indicating me with a jerk of his head.

"Sure he's a weakling," replies one of the ouens helping me – it is Jaarsie. "But he's a tough little guy – he never whines, and he never gives up."

These are three truncated excerpts from a much longer narrative, but they get the point across. The Anti-Afrikaans prejudice continued as before, but here, under the intensity of SADF Basic training, the Afrikaans guys were not merely like other

*(Continued on page 8)*

## Uittreksel uit "Ag man dit 'WAS' lekker in die Army" - van Danie Matthee

Een van die opwindendste oefeninge wat ons in die Army gedoen het was die helikopter drills. Ons moes op 'n hoogte van om en by 2m uit die helikopter spring en ons plek in 'n formasie op die grond inneem. Die seksie leier, 'n Koporaal, het seker te veel oorlog flieks gekyk want toe die eerste troep uit die helikopter spring skree hy: "Go, go, go" en gee die eerste ou nie 'n kans om weg te kom voor

die volgende ou uitspring nie. Ongelukkig land die eerste ou op die grond met sy geweer se loop na bo en voor hy nog op sy voete kan kom spring die tweede ou en land wydsbeen op die geweer se blitsbreker en met die derde en vierde ou nog op sy rug ook. Dit het ons pret heeltemal bederf, en dan praat ek nie eers van die arme ou met die seer ghoens nie, want die oefening was toe sommer

heeltemal gekanselleer.

Onder Korporaal H Matthee

1992



## Operation Displace: The last battle...

*(Continued from page 5)*

as he had expected, and took command of a combat team comprising his four missile Ratels, eight Ratel-90s of the 61 Mech anti-tank platoon and twelve Ratel-81s.

He deployed his force on the right of the road to Techipa. while the tank squadron and a mechanised infantry company deployed on the left of the road. They were in position by 18h00,

About last light on 26 June, Jan Hougaard and a small party on a koppie north of Calueque sent up several meteorological balloons to which they had tied chaff. About 20h00 the Cuban air defence system began to react, launching six SA-6s at the balloons. The launches were watched and plotted by the artillery observers.

The artillery then fired their strike, hitting se-

lected targets over a period of about four hours. The first salvo destroyed the Cuban artillery command post in Techipa, so the guns were left in peace to carry out their shoot without counter-bombardment to bother them. Only one Cuban battery reacted at all, firing some ten rounds before falling silent. There was no further reaction from Techipa.

*(Continued on page 8)*

## Operation Olyfhout

*(Continued from page 2)*

After SWAPO tracks were found close to the scene, Craig requested explosives to blow up what was left of the vehicles, but this, too, was denied. No SADF equipment was to be left behind in Angola, the military authorities ordered.

Foxtrot Company and the recovery team ran

into problems of their own on the way to the scene. SWAPO had accurately assessed the situation and laid numerous landmines on the route the rescue team would have to take, causing damage to several vehicles.

Ten days after being attacked by their own aircraft, the group exited Angola. An official in-

quiry showed that while the recce team's position had been plotted on the map in the Air Force operations room, the two Impala pilots had not been aware of their deployment, and had assumed the vehicles belonged to the enemy.



"The first salvo destroyed the Cuban artillery command post in Techipa"



A South African Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicle, backbone of the mechanised infantry

## Operation Displace: The last battle...



A UNIMOG-based ambulance used by the SA Medical Services

"The South Africans were disappointed that there had been no response by the Cuban armour"

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Puma helicopters stand ready to deploy troops at a moment's notice

*(Continued from page 7)*

The guns packed up and pulled out. They were followed soon after by 61 Mech, who wanted to be under cover against air observation before first light and pulled back about 22h00. Satisfied with the artillery strike, the South Africans were disappointed that there had been no response by the Cuban armour. Destroying some of it in the ambush would have done much to dissuade them from any operation against Calueque or Ruacana.

There was, in fact, some reaction. East of Techipa Lieutenant T.T. Abrieu was being chased by tanks and mechanised infantry that had found him. With the Cubans hot on his heels, he found that he could not establish communications, so all he could do was run. After some time

he had gained enough ground to give his radio another try. Establishing contact with Hougaard, he told him of his predicament. Hougaard told him to plot his position and stand by to direct fire. Once he had the position, the G-5 battery fired a ranging round. It was accurate, so 'TT' merely asked them to "search and sweep" while his patrol disengaged and made good its escape.

Early on 27 June Nortmann's force joined up with the mechanised infantry company commanded by Major Andre Vermeulen, who took command of the combined force. They moved up to their position of the previous night. Nortmann then suggested that they should deploy into combat formation and move farther north to deploy in a better anti-tank position.

Nortmann deployed a troop of Ratel-90s to either side of him and the four missile Ratels to his rear. He then advanced northwards on one side of the road to Techipa. The twelve Ratel-20s of the mechanised infantry followed behind them. The Ratel-81s moved by bounds to be able to provide support when needed. The tank squadron again moved up on the other side of the road, but fell about twenty minutes behind.

About 08h50 elements of the combat team reported that they were being shadowed by several tanks.

*Continued next week in Part 2*

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## The English-Afrikaans thing in the SADF, Part 3

*(Continued from page 6)*

ouens. They actually showed a self-sacrificing comradeship towards me – even to doing an opfok they didn't earn, just to show support.

There was absolutely no reason for them to help me like this. I was everything they were not: a weakling, English-speaking, a Catholic. But they did. They were kind-

ness itself, and never anything else. Why? I suppose it was in their nature to be so. Perhaps it had something to do with the fact that, by my staying on and voluntarily becoming G1K1, they recognised some *vasbyt* in me, as well as a love of country that I shared with them.

I was not a National Party supporter, but I cared deeply about

South Africa, and really did see National Service as a way of serving my country. And certainly, because of the values I had learned from my father, who by then had been dead for two years, I approached them with no bias as to their language or culture.

*Continued next week...*

## This past week, "Somewhere on the Border..."

On **11 February 1976**, the OAU officially acknowledged the MPLA government of Angola as the 47th member of the organisation.

France acknowledged the MPLA-government on **17 February 1976**, the first of the Western powers to do so.

FAPLA captured Serpa Pinto on **17 February 1976** and continued their advance southwards.

Bravo Group (who later became 32 Bn) started Operation Budgie during **February 1976**, with the aim of preventing the Cuando Cubango Province falling under SWAPO/FAPLA control.

The Rhodesian Air Force and SAAF bombed a ZIPRA camp in eastern

Angola on **25 February 1979** during Operation Vanity.

On **11 February 1980**, a platoon of 32 Bn made contact with a group of 40 SWAPO 12 km south-east of Chiede, called in gunship support, and killed two SWAPO, while the rest splintered and fled to the north.

The road from Chiede to Namacunde and Ongiva was mined by 32 Bn on **13 February 1980**.

On **13 February 1981**, 140 troops from 32 Bn attacked a SWAPO base near Ediva Lomwandi, killing thirteen and capturing one.

On **17 February 1981**, one company each from 1 SA Infantry Bn and 8 SA Infantry Bn were de-

ployed as stopper groups three kilometres apart, east of the Santa Clara-Namacunde road, while two platoons from 32 Bn were assigned to patrol the area north of Chiede, with another two operating further west.

32 Bn started with Operation Olyfhout on **17 February 1982**.

Operation Phoenix was launched on **15 February 1983** to counter the SWAPO Typhoon infiltration of white farm areas

South African and Angolan military and foreign affairs officials met in Lusaka on **13 February 1984** to discuss the disengagement of forces from Angola.

**16 February 1984** saw another round of talks

held in Lusaka to settle the details of the Lusaka Accord.

Angola claimed in **February 1986** that South Africans were operating in the area from Ongiva towards Lubango and also from Xangongo and Mupa into the interior.

On **14 February 1986**, 37 terrorists were killed in a clash with the Police Counter-Insurgency Unit in eastern Owambo.

By **mid-February 1986**, 43 Infiltrating terrorists had been killed in Owambo in the first major clashes of the year.

On **14 February 1988**, Fapla's 59 Brigade was attacked and driven from its positions near Cuito Cuanavale by South African forces.



### TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SADF AND SWATF!

Write the names of the units represented by the flashes below each one.

*Find the answers in next week's issue!*

### Last week's unit flashes:



**Regiment Groot Karoo (RGK)** was formed as 'Die Middelandsse Regiment' in

1934. It participated in the battle of El Alamein as a machine gun battalion in 1942. In 1954 they were renamed to the 'Regiment Gideon Scheepers' and converted to an armoured role, but in 1960 it was named RGK again and converted to infantry. It was part of the 82nd Mechanised Brigade in 1988 during Operation Packer.



**The Natal Carbineers** was raised in 1855 and took part in virtually every conflict

since, from the Zulu War of 1879, the Boer War (1899-1902), German SWA (1914-15), East Africa (1940-41), Western Desert (1941-43), and Italy (1943-45). It saw service in a counter-insurgency capacity in northern South West Africa for 3 months in 1976, and thereafter in numerous modular deployments over the next decade.



**Sector 40** was one of the four sectors which specifically fell directly under South-West

African Territory Force (SWATF) control. Each sector had its own headquarters which was responsible for the command and administration of Area Force Units in its Area Of Responsibility. Sector 40's headquarters was based in Windhoek.



Members of 32 Bn relaxing around a fire

Images from "Grensoorlog" series, by Linda de Jager, reproduced with kind permission by MNET

## Schedule of Events


- 18 February 2012 — CoMMiESFest 2012, Colorado
- 18 February 2012 — ModelFiesta 31, Texas
- 18 February 2012 — Blizcon 2012, Ohio
- 19 February 2012 — Huddersfield 2012, UK
- 20-23 February 2012 — International Armoured Vehicles, UK
- 21-23 February 2012 — 3rd Annual Cloud Computing for DoD & Government, USA
- 21-23 February 2012 — Directed Energy Systems 2012, Germany
- 21-23 February 2012 — 2nd Electronic Warfare Summit, USA
- 24 February 2012 — Anchorage IPMS Annual contest, Alaska

## FEBRUARY 2012

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29			

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
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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

The War In Angola  
 34 Glen Oak Rd  
 Welcome Glen  
 Simons Town 7995 South Africa

Phone: +27 (0)72 409-6271  
 Fax: 086 626-3388 (SA only)  
 E-mail: info@warinangola.com

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The War In Angola website ([www.warinangola.com](http://www.warinangola.com)) is dedicated to recreating and re-fighting the battles between the adversaries of the Angolan War (or Border War as it is also known), that is, the SADF and UNITA on the one side and the Soviet-supplied FAPLA, Cuba, and SWAPO on the other side. In order to recreate the battles as accurate as possible, a lot of research is required about the equipment, organisation, quality, uniforms, command, support and logistical structures behind the different forces.

There are two sides to the website: the gaming and recreation of the miniature battles; and the historical facts and research of the forces behind the battles.

The dividing line between the two sides is deliberately blurred in order to expose both sides to all the users, thereby promoting and exposing the wargaming and modeling hobby to the historically inclined and vice-versa.

Johan Schoeman

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## Last week's latest topics on the Forums

### Link to the Forums:

<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=590>

### RE: Please feel free to post your views and comments by stuart smith (guest)

why have you copied my post do you know anything?

### RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

En laastens:

### RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

En nog 'n paar:

### RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

Nog:

### RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

En nog meer:

### RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

Nog meer van sy motorfiets:

### RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

Ek het die man by 32 se boom

ontmoet. Kyk net die ongelooflike werk op sy motorfiets:

### SOLDIERS OF WAR MC by Ninja

Ons het verlede jaar November 2011 n nuwe motorfiets klub gestig, naam van club is: SOLDIERS OF WAR MC. Ons is in die Gauteng area, Springs. As daar ou soldate is, wat inbesit is van n mo...

### RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

To the Silent Soldier...

### RE: Angola 1987 by Mark (another one) (guest)

I was in 4 SAI anti Tank Platoon and deployed in Angola during OPS Hooper, the Milan missile system was primarily used by the 90mm Ratel group (using a 3 man team) and as stated to supplement 32 BT f...

### RE: Please feel free to post your views and comments by 4man

Posted By n/a on 12/1/2011 3:03:53 PM hello i live in yorkshire near castleford were i understand mr marchant is after his release if he comes on this forum i would be very grateful if he would sp...

### Repatriation of the mortal remains of the Ebo Four by host

"Dear Friends You are hereby cordially informed that the Angolan authorities have now also given their consent for the exhumation and repatriation of the mortal remains of the Ebo Four. Key role...

### RE: The attack on 16 Brigade: 9 November 1987 by steveh

"The noise was deafening as we moved forward past 12 Bravo and took their place in the advance formation. Bullets kept smacking and pinging off the armour and I was straining to see anything other th...