

WAR IN ANGOLA


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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

The MPLA position in Central-Angola, Oct 1975



Featured Gallery: Operation Sceptic, 1980



A soldier sits on Ratel 9G after a firefight



Troops armed with an AT launcher in front of an Eland 60



Samil trucks in convoy pass some decrepit buildings

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- Northern Angola: MPLA Strategy
- Northern Angola: The Republic of South Africa gets involved
- Featured Equipment: The magnetic limpet mines
- Operation Super, Part 1
- Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Zhdarkin Part 34

Photos: SANDF Documentation Centre

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The war from July to September 1975



UNITA soldiers moving up to the front with RPGs

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"...led to South Africa launching search and destroy operations across the border."

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SAAF DC-3 transport plane

The first article on the South African Defence Force's direct involvement in central-Angola:

While the training of FNLA- and UNITA-soldiers continued at Mpupa, Serpa Pinto (Menongue) and Capolo, the situation at the front took such a turn for the worst that the South African Defence Force became involved. To understand this, the progress of the conflict from July to September should be considered in brief.

As had been already described, the war between the MPLA and FNLA/UNITA gradually and sporadically expanded, and had intensified quickly during the first half of 1975. At

many places across the entire Angola, small and larger clashes erupted, only to quieten down and erupt again. After the FNLA were driven from Luanda in the beginning of July, Holden Roberto announced his counter-offensive on 13 July 1975, and indeed managed to recapture Caxito, about 60 kilometres north of Luanda, on 24 July 1975. Neither Roberto's nor Chipenda's intended advances to the capital actually materialised.

Stockwell, who visited Caxito about a month later, was not very impressed by the FNLA's achievement. The town had indeed been virtually destroyed by mortars, bazookas, etc., but there was no sign of any sort

of defence. "There were no bunkers or foxholes, no piles of expended rounds... The MPLA had fled without making a serious effort at defending Caxito, and the damage had been done by rampaging FNLA forces as they swept through unopposed." (J. Stockwell, **In search of enemies**, p.130) Despite also being driven from Luanda by the MPLA, UNITA had not actively taken part in the war at that stage. This changed, however, during the first week of August. On 3 August 1975 MPLA soldiers apparently fired on Savimbi's plane at Silva Porto, and heavy fighting broke out in this city during the next few days. The MPLA were driven from

Silva Porto became Savimbi's headquarters

the city and Silva Porto became Savimbi's headquarters. (Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, **After Angola. The war in Southern Africa**, p.53. – Hodges gives a brief report of how the conflict progressed during these months, mostly based on newspaper reports)

Similar events occurred at Serpa Pinto (Menongue) at about the same time. On 2 August 1975, the FNLA- and UNITA-forces warned some of the inhabitants to leave the town because they were going to launch an attack on the MPLA-offices in the town during the following night. A witness, Mr. Edgar de Carmona, told how his house became the centre point of the fighting that night be-

cause of its location right next to the MPLA offices. The house was largely destroyed while he and his wife spent a fearful night hiding inside. The approximately 1 000 civilian inhabitants of the town found refuge at the FNLA/UNITA sector, while the fight for control of the town continued for several days, according to Carmona. Thereafter the MPLA withdrew and Serpa Pinto became a southern headquarters of the FNLA. (SADF Archives)

On 8 August 1975, a relatively large-scale battle erupted between MPLA- and FNLA-soldiers in the Luanda district, during which the Portuguese regime yielded to the MPLA demand that FNLA min-

isters should be recalled from the interim government. Upon that, UNITA also recalled its ministers and soldiers from Luanda.

During the first week of August there were clashes between the MPLA and UNITA in the Cunene-district which contributed to the unrest on the border of South-West Africa. SWAPO activities, amongst other things, also led to South Africa launching search and destroy operations across the border. This led to the temporary capture of Pereira de Eça (Ongiva) and the occupation of the Calueque-Ruacana terrain, as already described. After this, the capital city of

(Continued on page 7)

Featured Equipment: The M46 and M57 anti-tank mines

The TM-46 mine is a large circular metal cased Russian anti-tank mine. The only difference between the Soviet TM46 and TMN46 anti-tank mine is that the latter is equipped with a booby-trap fuse well set to one side in the base. This secondary fuse well can be fitted with a pull-fuse which functions as an anti-handling device. Both mines should always be treated when found, therefore, as being of the TMN46 type and fitted with an anti-lift system. These mines are round, flattish, steel casings, painted green, with a slightly domed, ridged top, containing, in the centre, a scalloped cap for the MV-5 pressure-fuse well. The filling plug is located on the side beneath the light metal

handle. The mine contains 5.7 kg of TNT, detonated by a centrally-placed 200 gm block booster-charge, also of TNT, which in turn is activated by a MD-6 detonator attached to the MV-5 igniter, which is inserted in the booster-charge and connected directly to the fuse — a 180 kg force is sufficient to set off the mine. Although these mines were designed for use with the PMR-3 and PMR-60 mine-laying chutes, it is quite feasible to lay them by hand, either in groups or as a single weapon. Because the TM-46 has a metal casing it is very easy to detect with a mine-detector. However, mine-fields containing TM-46s may have also been sown with minimum metal mineslike the PMA-2.

The TM-57 has a larger main charge and improved fusing compared to the earlier TM-46. It is circular with a metal case and a central fuse well. A secondary MUV or VPF fuse can be fitted on the side of the mine. The tilt rod fuse gives the mine improved resistance to blast; it is activated when it is forced to a deflection of 25 to 30 degrees.

From "Brassey's Infantry Weapons of the Warsaw Pact Armies", edited by J.I.H. Owen; and Wikipedia

For more information on the TM46 and TM57 anti-tank mines, also see Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TM-46_mine and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TM-57_mine



TM mines were captured by the thousands and put to good use

Specifications

Country of Origin:	USSR	
	TM46 & TMN46	TM57
Diameter:	305 mm (in)	316 mm (in)
Height:	108 mm (in)	102 mm (in)
Weight:	8.6 kg (lb)	8.47 kg (lb)
Body Material:	Sheet Steel	Sheet Steel
Charge:	5.7 kg (lb) TNT	6.34 kg (lb) TNT
Detonator Mechanism:	Pressure of 180 kg	

"Because the mine has a metal casing it is very easy to detect with a mine-detector."

The M46 anti-tank mine



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Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Zhdarkin, Part 33



Russian advisors in attendance

"...suddenly this chap appeared with his chest full of decorations and medals."

This is the thirty-third part of a 52-part series taken from "**We did not see it even in Afghanistan**". Memoirs of a participant of the Angolan war (1986-1988)", by Lieutenant Colonel Igor Anatolevich Zhdarkin

– Returning again to decorations, when Cubans began to distribute medals for Cuito-Cuanavale, our leaders came from Luanda and took for themselves 17 medals, allegedly for those who had long served in Cuito but had been transferred to other districts. Yet they nonetheless gave out these medals to those four who had also beaten the table with their fists, shouting "give us our decorations!"

They also received

(according to my rough estimate) still other medals that they might otherwise have received. Moreover, there was still another Cuban medal, "Servicio Distinguido" (For distinguished service), Cuban medal for having fulfilled one's internationalist duty, as well as Angolan medals of the category, "For outstanding service". Attached to small ribbons, such little medals resembled our own Soviet five-kopek piece.

And again we failed to understand why they decorated with Angolan medals some people in Cuito-Cuanavale, and we asked, "What for?" And strangest of all, the people decorated, themselves, did not understand why.

And general Ryabchenko, covering his chest with all this large quantity of decorations, appeared in this manner at the General Staff, during his furlough in Moscow. The populace was stunned with surprise. The operation, "Greeting October" (1987) had been messed up. After so many losses, and such devastation (among the Angolans), suddenly this chap appeared with his chest full of decorations and medals.

Why, strictly speaking, did such a bias begin – describe in greater detail the heroic deed committed by the comrades. In other words, what does "aid" mean in this situation? Ryabchenko, in my opinion, received the order of Lenin for An-

Ryabchenko received the order of Lenin for Angola

gola, for having planned the operation, an operation that ultimately had failed. (Likewise, they said that he had sat for two years in Kabul during the war in Afghanistan, and had received the order of Lenin for having planned the operation.)

– **And what about the medals for Cuito-Cuanavale?**

– It was just a big «presentation».

The Cubans made medals for Cuito-Cuanavale, in order to decorate their own authentic participants of the defence of Cuito-Cuanavale, as well as Soviet and Angolan participants.

How was all this done?

The Cubans, in this scheme, were of course great guys. The airplane carrying these medals arrived in Luanda. In Luanda, however, no one from among Soviet advisors was alerted to this. The airplane thereupon set off on a direct route towards Cuito-Cuanavale. It was the year 1988. Then the plane arrived in Cuito-Cuanavale.

The Cubans phoned us via our special line, and Lieutenant Vyacheslav Barabula, my friend, talked with them. They told him word for word the following – "We brought the medals and it is necessary to decorate people. If possible, please give us your own list, and introduce the

real participants of the defence of Cuito-Cuanavale. Although they have been in Cuito one month only, they have a right to be decorated. They have been under bombardment, and so forth, and so on.

Slava came over to me and asked, "Igor, how shall we do all this?"

"Well, I don't know", I said. "Lets go to the 'Cubashi', as we call them, and discuss everything with them". (We usually called them the "Cubashi".)

He replied, "Well, OK, fine. I'll come back soon".

To be continued next week in Part 34...



Russian advisor photographed with his SWAPO advisees

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Operation Displace: The Air Attack on Calueque

Extract taken with the author's permission from: "War In Angola - The Final South African Phase", by Helmoed-Römer Heitman.

At 13h55 on 27 June, a patrol from 102 Battalion in the hills above Ruacana reported that four MiG-23s had just flown over them heading south-east. At 13h57 more were reported flying from Ruacana towards Calueque. Hougaard was in his tactical headquarters at the time. He sent out a quick warning over the radio and ran outside in time to see the MiGs fly along the river and bank as they lined up for their attack. Then he heard the bombs and saw the

smoke and dust of the explosions. Four of the MiGs dropped three bombs each while the other four covered them.

Their bombs gone, the MiGs turned and Hew back over the Calucquc installation before heading north for home. One Cuban pilot displayed true fighter pilot dash, rolling his aircraft and flying over the scene inverted. At 14h05 three more MiGs bombed Calucquc.

Seven MiGs had struck the dam wall with parachute-retarded bombs and scored several hits, which severely damaged the bridge that runs over it. The eighth MiG had turned off and bombed the fresh water pipeline to Owambo, one of his

bombs damaging it. Another exploded near a Buffel parked nearby. It killed ten men of 8 SAI who had been standing next to the Buffel. One soldier of 701 Battalion on the bridge was wounded by fragments. Another jumped the four stories down to the spillway and ran away unhurt. Nortmann's luck had held once again; the Rinkhals in which he had been treated and which had just driven off had been parked beside the destroyed Buffel.

The 32 Battalion anti-aircraft troop engaged the MiGs with their 20 mm cannon and scored some hits. A signals intercept revealed later that one MiG crashed on the way back to



Olifant tanks in action at the Army Battle School during an exercise

"...exploded near a Buffel parked nearby killing ten men of 8 SAI who had been standing next to the Buffel."

One MiG crashed on the way back to Lubango.

Lubango.

The air raid on the Calueque installations raised many questions as to its purpose. The Cubans have generally said that it was in response to the fighting that morning given their inability to provide prompt air support for ground forces during the earlier fighting in the south-east; that does not seem very likely. The timing of the events means that they had only two hours between the opening shots of the ground fighting and the arrival of the MiGs over Calueque. Even flying from Cahama, that would suppose a degree of efficiency in their strike planning system that was not demonstrated at

any other time.

It is more likely that their reconnaissance had noticed the work on the ramps at the Calueque bridge. This bridge gave the South Africans a second heavy vehicle crossing over the Cunene and the ability to deploy mechanised forces more flexibly. Destroying it would restrict them to the low water bridge at Ruacana which was potentially vulnerable to being sealed off by ground forces. The attack on the Calueque bridge therefore made excellent tactical sense if it was planned to co-incide with a more active posture along the border. Without it, the South Africans were unlikely to

react forcibly, and might even be induced to withdraw their mechanised forces south of the river lest they should be cut off by a Cuban attack on the Ruacana crossing. Combining this attack with a mechanised advance on the force then known to be deployed at Calueque might have caused the South Africans to withdraw all their forces from north of the Cunene. That would have given the Cubans the victory they needed at little risk. It did not turn out quite as intended because the South Africans pre-empted it with their artillery strike and the deployment of 61 Mech.

The successful air attack

(Continued on page 8)



Alouette helicopter providing CASEVAC support

The English-Afrikaans thing in the SADF, Part 5



South African parachute infantry (Parabats) ready to stand up and jump

“Afrikaans is a ‘dying language’ not worth bothering about...”

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SAAF Puma helicopter about to take off

From the WarBlogs (www.warblogs.co.za), written by: The Ancient Armourer

Another is that it is more useful to learn an “African language.” How many people I heard say, back then, that they would rather learn Zulu than Afrikaans. Today, when Zulu is an available option in KZN schools, they are giving preference to Afrikaans, though they still don’t really bother to learn it. Natal English-speakers appear to be as unilingual as ever. For the record, I, the friend of “Dutchman” and “hairybacks”, speak English, Afrikaans and Zulu, as do many Natal Afrikaners. Some Natal English-speakers know Zulu, though not many. But the

real oddity is that Afrikaans is as much an African language as Zulu, Xhosa or Sotho. It was spoken by Malay slaves in the Cape for at least a century before it was adopted by the white Afrikaner. In fact, the white Afrikaner may very well be the only white nation in history who has adopted a black language as his own.

Which leads to another “reason” for not speaking Afrikaans: it is claimed to be the “oppressor’s language”. For 45 years, while the National Party ruled South Africa, there might be a something of a case for this view. But this must be seen against the background of English as a mandatory imperial language for 300 years, the language of a nation that, amongst other events, is

guilty of brutal oppression against the Native American, the Indian, the Australian Aborigine, the Maori and the Kikuyu, not even to mention the Boer republics. If ever there were a case for an oppressor’s language between English and Afrikaans, English wins hands down every time.

But this is not an argument that achieves anything – most languages have been an oppressor’s language at one time in or another their history, including many African languages. It is dangerous to single out any one particular language for this exclusive role. Was Afrikaans an oppressor’s language, for example, when the only people in South Africa who spoke it were Malay slaves? Or the “coloured” population

This is a type of argument far better left sleeping.

during the apartheid era? This is a type of argument far better left sleeping.

Another reason I have heard expressed with a certain frequency is that Afrikaans is a “dying language” not worth bothering about. This is without doubt wishful thinking, based on the predicate that the “oppressor’s language” would be rejected holubolus in a new and democratic South Africa, with the resultant conclusive triumph of English. But has this been the case? With the depoliticisation of Afrikaans since 1994, it has flourished as a language. When I moved to Oudtshoorn in 1992, the

Cape Times was the newspaper of choice amongst bruin Afrikaners. When I left in 2002, it stood in stacks in the tea rooms. The newspaper of preference had become universally Die Burger: Landelik.

All the great Afrikaans cultural festivals are post-apartheid phenomena. Afrikaans literature is written by a diversity of people, including black ANC member Matthews Phosa, former Mpumalanga Premier, who has read his poetry at the Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunstefees. Afrikaans has broken out of its ideological straitjacket and become the language of a universal South African culture;

white, black, coloured, Christian, Muslim – the variety is wide. In the film Tsotsi, the characters speak in flaaitaal, the characteristic Soweto dialect of Afrikaans. In authors such as Deon Meyer, Afrikaans has recently become the language of excellent detective thrillers, again set very much in the new South Africa. Dying language? If anything, it is Afrikaans that is enjoying an unparalleled “African Renaissance.”

So in the end, what is one to say about the old English-Afrikaans thing? I am no wiser as to its origins or meaning now than when I first encoun-

(Continued on page 8)


Uittreksel uit "Ag man dit 'WAS' lekker in die Army" - van Danie Matthee

Dit was net voor ons naweek pas en ons was op die skietbaan besig met teiken skiet. Die Majoor laat ons toe mooi verstaan dat as hy nie gelukkig is met ons groepering nie, sal niemand op pas gaan nie. Dit was my beurt om in die skietgat te wees en die ou, ek weet steeds nie wie dit was nie, wie se teiken ek moes beman se groepering was glad nie iets om oor huis toe te skryf nie. Hy skiet die hele teiken vol en ek is

seker 'n paar skote het die teiken heeltemal gemis. Toe ons die teiken sak om die telling te neem en ek sien hierdie ou is hopeloos en gaan maak dat ons nie op pas sal gaan nie, plak ek van die gate toe en maak nuwe gate met 'n potlood sodat dit lyk of hierdie ou 'n ware skerpskutter is. Ek glo nie ek was die enigste ou wat dit gedoen het nie want niemand was bereid om hulle pas prys te gee vir 'n poephol wat

nie kan skiet nie.

Onder Korporaal H Matthee
1992



The war from July to September 1975

(Continued from page 2)

the Cunene-district, Pereira de Eça, was occupied by the MPLA.

On 14 August serious clashes occurred between the MPLA and UNITA at Lobito and Benguela. Already in May 1975, Lobito had experienced its first battles when the MPLA attacked the UNITA offices. UNITA had apparently stood firm on this

occasion, but in August the situation was rather different. Under continuous attack, the UNITA-forces were driven from Lobito, Benguela, Moçamedes (Namibe) and Sá de Bandeira (Lubango). The same occurred to the east at Luso (Luena), on 16 August 1975. Again, with the limited information available, it is difficult to establish how heavy and to what extent the battles had been.

In the meantime the MPLA had made considerable gains in the districts of Cuanza Norte, Malanje, and Lunda. By the end of August the MPLA occupied 11 of the 16 districts. (C. Legum and T.Hodges, **After Angola. The war in Southern Africa**, pp. 53-55. – It was the districts of Cabinda, Luanda, Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul, Melanje, Lunda, Benguela, Moxico, Moçamedes, Huil and

The MPLA was getting the upper hand

Cunene)

By the end of September it was indeed apparent that the MPLA was getting the upper hand. Occupation of the capital meant control of the entire governmental and communication apparatus. The entire coastline, with the exception of a part north of the capital,

was also in MPLA hands. This included the important ports of Cabinda, Luanda, Lobito and Moçamedes (Namibe). After the capture of Caxito, the FNLA's advance to Luanda was stopped at Quifangondo, 20 kilometres northeast of the capital, on 30 August

1975. (C. Legum and T. Hodges, **After Angola. The war in Southern Africa**, p. 55)

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"By the end of August the MPLA occupied 11 of the 16 districts."



A South African Buffel armoured personnel carrier is not a very sleek sight

Operation Displace: The Air Attack on Calueque



South African Parachute Infantry (Parabats) being dropped during an exercise

Link to this story:

<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1053>

“The Cuban force in Angola was built up to almost 60 000 men...”

(Continued from page 5)

on the bridge nevertheless enabled the Cubans to claim a victory, even if it was not as impressive as intended in their planning. It was also not, however, as ineffective as it might seem. The loss of the Calueque bridge did hamper the South Africans considerably, although the fact that no Cuban or Fapla ground forces were able to follow it up meant that the bridge could have been repaired. Perhaps more importantly, the stray bomb that killed ten men raised the political cost of the conflict to the South African government.

At the same time, however, the outcome of the ground fighting on 27 June re-minded the Cubans that it would not be a good idea to push for a military success. Fighting the South Africans was too expensive and any further heavy losses

might make it impossible to disengage from Angola without loss of prestige.

The Fighting Ends

The fighting of 26 and 27 June effectively marked the end of the South African involvement in the Angolan conflict, for the time being at least.

The Cubans increased their MiG sorties along and over the border, and their ground forces moved about north of the Cunene, but they were careful not to provoke the South Africans too much. They kept well away from Calueque, where the South African force remained deployed until the end. Nor do they seem to have been involved in the border incidents of the next few months. It seems likely that these involved only Swapo elements.

The Cuban force in Angola was built up to almost 60 000 men during

the last months of the negotiations, but does not seem to have become involved in major operations. This reinforcement had been initiated at a time when it was not clear whether the South Africans intended to stop east of the Cuito or to drive Fapla back to Menongue. Once the reinforcement was in train, it was simply allowed to continue after the immediate need had passed, as a contingency measure and to reassure Luanda that Cuba was prepared to stand behind its ally.

The South Africans were meanwhile worried that the Cubans might have plans to thrust into South West Africa to bring their campaign in Angola to a suitable finale. With that in mind, it was decided to establish a proper formation headquarters at Oshakati to control the conventional forces in Sector 10.

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The English-Afrikaans thing in the SADF, Part 5

(Continued from page 6)

tered it. As I read SADF accounts of the '70s and '80s, I see a few Afrikaners who were surprised by the hostility towards them. I see many English-speakers who reckoned that Afrikaners were hostile towards them. And I see a few fellows who reckon that the SADF training threw them all together until

the differences became meaningless. I seem to be quite a rarity, in that I experienced intense prejudice from the English-speaking side of the divide and nothing but kindness and openness from Afrikaners. But what I experienced is fact, and it has shaped and affected my life ever since. I can only attribute it to the good work of my Italian late father; bilin-

gualism and broad patriotism. I think it shaped my attitudes, and that shaping might very well have made the difference in my experience and my life.

Today, the anti-Afrikaans prejudice still exists in pockets. But today, fortunately, it is an isolated and marginal phenomenon. Most of us have grown up and moved on. Or emigrated.



Mirage F1 of the SAAF being bombed up with what appears to be a 450kg cluster bomb

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This past week, "Somewhere on the Border..."

The first Russian personnel arrived in Angola during **February 1975**.

On **25 February 1975**, representatives of the FNLA approached the South African Embassy in Trafalgar Square, London, with a request for armaments from Mr. Holden Roberto.

By **March 1975**, the FNLA had already taken over fourteen bases, some of which were safari camps, from the Portuguese in southeast Angola.

On **1 March 1977**, a 32 Battalion platoon found signs of enemy activity around Chana Mambuandi, and encountered a small group of 5 SWAPO, which fled.

On **24 February 1978**, a

large group of SWAPO terrorists abducted 240 children and a teacher from the Anglican school at St Mary's Mission Station, 3km from the border and took 160 of them into Angola, the others having escaped.

During **February 1979**, the largest group of SWAPO terrorists to operate inside Owambo, some 250 of them, fired at the Army base at Nkongo with small arms and mortars, but then quickly withdrew over the border.

Also during **February 1979**, a group of SWAPO terrorists mortared the SADF base at Elundu.

The Rhodesian Air Force and the SAAF bombed a ZIPRA camp in eastern

Angola during on **25 and 26 February 1979**.

During **February 1980**, SWAPO had laid a record 42 mines on the sand roads of Owambo.

It was also discovered during **February 1980** that additional members of SWAPO's 'Special Unit' entered Owambo to attack headmen and black members of the security forces.

Elections were held in Rhodesia on **28 February 1980**.

On **27 February 1982**, a 32 Battalion convoy was accidentally attacked by 2 SAAF Impalas during Operation Olyfhout.


The Joint Monitoring Commission started operating at Cuvelai on **25 February 1984**.

157 SWAPO terrorists have been killed this year up to the end of **February 1985**, with the security forces having had lost 7 killed.

During **February 1986**, the first SWAPO terrorists of the new infiltration had been deployed to two camps in the Cubango River area, and one in central southern Angola.

In **February 1986**, Angola claimed that South Africans were operating in the area from Ongiva towards Lubango. And also from Xangongo and Mupa into the interior.

38 Children were abducted from a school in Owambo by terrorists on **1 March 1986**.



TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SADF AND SWATF!

Write the names of the units represented by the flashes below each one.

Find the answers in next week's issue!

Last week's unit flashes:



101 Air Supply Platoon (ASP) was established in 1963 at Bloemfontein but all

training occurred at the Army Services School at Voortrekkerhoogte. It was incorporated into 44 Parachute Brigade when it was formed in 1979 and relocated to Pretoria in 1980. It took part in operations in Angola from 1975 through 1989 including Operations Savannah, Bowler, Askari, Moduler, Hooper, Packer and Merlyn.



The Kimberley Commando was originally established in Kimberley in 1936 as the

Kimberley Rifle Commando and renamed in 1964. Its headquarters was initially based in the private homes of its commanding officers. In 1964, 1970, 1974 and 1980 the HQ was moved around until it finally shared space with Group 22 HQ at Scanlan Street. From 1976 the unit provided troops for service in the SWA Operational Area.



The South African Defence Force Chief of Staff Intelligence provided intelli-

gence-based staff services to the Chief of the SADF and was the second of the six departments and thus numbered as such. The staff functions were all based at the Defence Force Headquarters in Pretoria. Each service: the SA Army, the SA Air Force, the SA Navy and the SA Medical Services, had its own Intelligence Staff function.



South African Commando Ratel on the move

Images from "Grensoorlog" series, by Linda de Jager, reproduced with kind permission by MNET

Schedule of Events


- 3 March 2012 — RiverCon 1, Louisiana
- 3 March 2012 — East of England Model Show, UK
- 3 March 2012 — North Somerset Model Show, UK
- 8 March 2012 — SA Military History Society Cape Town: SUBJECT AND SPEAKER TO BE ADVISED
- 8 March 2012 — Military Miscellany; and The Campaign of Vicksburg
- 8 March 2012 — SA Military History Society Durban: The Final Days of the U-boats; and Rider Haggard and the Anglo-Zulu War
- 11 March 2012 — Shuttleworth Collection Scale Model Exhibition, UK
- 12 March 2012 — SA Military History Society Eastern Cape: Military Mascots/Pets

MARCH 2012

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
				1	2	3
						10
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

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
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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

The War In Angola
 34 Glen Oak Rd
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 E-mail: info@warinangola.com

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The War In Angola website (www.warinangola.com) is dedicated to recreating and re-fighting the battles between the adversaries of the Angolan War (or Border War as it is also known), that is, the SADF and UNITA on the one side and the Soviet-supplied FAPLA, Cuba, and SWAPO on the other side. In order to recreate the battles as accurate as possible, a lot of research is required about the equipment, organisation, quality, uniforms, command, support and logistical structures behind the different forces.

There are two sides to the website: the gaming and recreation of the miniature battles; and the historical facts and research of the forces behind the battles.

The dividing line between the two sides is deliberately blurred in order to expose both sides to all the users, thereby promoting and exposing the wargaming and modeling hobby to the historically inclined and vice-versa.

Johan Schoeman

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Last week's latest topics on the Forums

Link to the Forums:

<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=590>

RE: Permission Request by johansamin

Hi, Big Gun. I can email the images to you, but the ones I use are only 147x174 pixels (thats all I need for my purposes). If you need better quality and larger images of the flashes, you can downloa...

Permission Request by Big Gun (guest)

Hi I did my National Service at 14 Field regt and School of artillery. I would like permission of copies of their repective flashes. I can be contacted on Mike.Nicol@urs.co.za. please advise on proced...

RE: Please feel free to post your views and comments by Colin Reeves (guest)

Hi Guys, Came to South Africa in 1980. Served in UK Forces from 1952 to 1980 (RAF, 17/21 Lancers and Defence Fire Services). Served as a Fireman in various places in RSA and

joined Nelspruit Comman...

RE: Please feel free to post your views and comments by stuart smith (guest)

why have you copied my post do you know anything?

RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

En laastens:

RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

En nog 'n paar:

RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

Nog:

RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

En nog meer:

RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

Nog meer van sy motorfiets:

RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

Ek het die man by 32 se boom ontmoet. Kyk net die ongelooflike werk op sy motorfiets:

SOLDIERS OF WAR MC by Ninja

Ons het verlede jaar November 2011 n nuwe motorfiets klub gestig, naam van club is: SOLDIERS OF WAR MC. Ons is in die Gauteng area, Springs. As daar ou soldate is, wat inbesit is van n mo...

RE: SILENT SOLDIERS MC by broer

To the Silent Soldier...

RE: Angola 1987 by Mark (another one) (guest)

I was in 4 SAI anti Tank Platoon and deployed in Angola during OPS Hooper, the Milan missile system was primarily used by the 90mm Ratel group (using a 3 man team) and as stated to supplement 32 BT f...