

# WAR IN ANGOLA

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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

## Operation Sceptic: Battle Group 61's plan to capture Smokeshell

The forces available to **Battle Group 61** were divided into six combat teams:

- **Combat Team 1**, commanded by Major P.S. "Paul" Fouche, with an anti-tank platoon and three mechanised platoons of Alpha Company under command.
- **Combat Team 2**, commanded by Captain L.J. "Louis" Harmse, with a anti-tank platoon and three mechanised platoons of Bravo Company under command. For the initial part of the operation, the mortar platoon was also allocated to the combat team.
- **Combat Team 3**, commanded by Captain D.J.F. "Jakes" Jacobs with under his command three armoured car troops, four support troop sections and one engineer section.
- **Combat Team 4**, commanded by Captain Mack Alexander with a parachute company comprising of three stopper groups of 28 men each.
- **Combat Team 5**, commanded by Captain Piet Nel with a parachute company also comprising of three stopper groups of 28 men each.
- **Combat Team 6**, the reserve combat team, commanded by Major J.A.B. Swart, comprising of an engineer troop in Buffels and an assault pioneer platoon in Ratels.
- **Medium Artillery Battery**, commanded by Major T.J. "Tobie" Vermaak comprising of 8 x 140mm guns, the 81mm mortar platoon (8 x 81mm mortars) and one infantry platoon under command.
- **A Echelon**, under WO1 M.C. Barnard, comprising of 43 vehicles organised into A1 echelons for

*(Continued on page 2)*

### Featured Gallery: Operation Sceptic



*A SAMIL in a convoy moves past some derelict buildings in Angola*



*A Recovery Ratel can be seen right in the front of this line of vehicles*



*Another group of soldiers attending the order group*

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- Angolan Independence: Political cooperation between FNLA and UNITA
- Featured Equipment: The A-55/B-56 radio
- Operation Sceptic Part 4: The operation starts
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- Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Zhdarkin Part 48

Images with kind permission from "61 Mechanised Battalion Group Veterans Association", [www.61mech.org.za](http://www.61mech.org.za)

## Operation Savannah: Consolidation of Task Force Zulu



OP SCEPTIC: Commandant Dippies Dippenaar and Major Paul Fouche from Alpha company appreciating the first sunbeams of the early morning

### Link to this story:

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"The trucks obtained from the Portuguese refugees were referred to by the personnel as 'vegetable trucks'."

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OP SCEPTIC: Key personnel involved in the operation pose together

*The second article of a series about Task Force Zulu and their advance to Sa da Bandeira and Moçamedes.*

While Battle Group Alpha was being equipped on the Rundu firing range, Battle Group Bravo was moved from Mpupa to Calai for consolidation. After Commandant Kotzé arrived at Rundu on Sunday 12 October, he received a detailed briefing from Colonel van Heerden and instructed to prepare an operational instruction. It was Commandant Kotzé that allocated the name Zulu to the task force. According to journalist Robert Moss the use of names such as Zulu, Alpha and Bravo caused much confusion amongst the Cubans. ("**Castro's secret war exposed**", Sunday Telegraph, 30 January 1977)

In order to disguise the fact that South West Africa was the starting point for the operation, it was decided to not aim directly at Pereira de Eça as a first objective from Owambo, but rather to

advance along the Cubango (Kavango) River up to Caiundo and from there westward via Nehone to Pereira de Eça (Ongiva).

Other than the commanding officer, Colonel van Heerden, the headquarters also comprised of Commandant Kotzé as second-in-command, Commandant Shylock Mulder of the Engineer Regiment who just happened to visit Rundu and was duly appointed as Staff Officer Logistics, and Captain Dave Mack, responsible for staff services, intelligence, operations and all other tasks given to him as deemed necessary. Dr. E.G. (Etienne) Botha, who was busy with his National Service at Rundu, together with two orderlies, made up the medical team of the task force. Signaller M.J. da Silva, a National Serviceman who could speak Portuguese, was the radio operator and driver of Colonel van Heerden's command vehicle and also had to act as buyer of supplies, liaison

officer, interpreter, mechanic, and chef.

Commandants Kotzé and Mulder, Captain Mack and Dr. Botha travelled in the second vehicle which made up the headquarters. The rest of the convoy comprised of trucks obtained from the Portuguese refugees which were referred to by the personnel as "vegetable trucks". On these were loaded all the rations for seven days, fuel and ammunition for two battle groups. There were no technical service personnel available to do any repairs. The engineers were represented only by Staff-Sergeant P. Lubbe (with Alpha) and Staff-Sergeant C. Spiller (with Bravo). The first-mentioned later received the Pro Merito Medal for his bravery during the operation. There were no ambulance, no water cart, no equipped kitchen, and no tents. Only the most essential items were taken with.

*Next week: Problems at Caiundo...*

## Battle Group 61's plan to capture Smokeshell

*(Continued from page 1)*

Combat Teams 1 to 3. The light workshop troop under command of Major W. Diffenthal would move with the echelon.

- **Battle Group Headquarters** with Major J.N.R Botha as Second-In-Command, Captain M. Rall as Adjutant, the intelligence officers, Captain P.J.

Botes and Lieutenant O.J. Swanepoel, as well as other attached personnel.

**The plan** on how Battle Group 61 was to execute its tasks was as follows:

Battle Group 61 was to destroy the SWAPO command, control and logistical structure at the Smokeshell and londe complexes respectively on 10 and 11 June 1980. After that they were to

engage in area operations for at least ten days in the area east of the general line Smokeshell – Dova – Mulemba and north of the general line Dunatana – Mulavi including londe.

**Phase 1:** Movement from Omuthiya to Mulemba On D-3 Combat Team 3 was to start the movement from Omuthiya in order to secure and de-

*(Continued on page 7)*

## Featured Equipment: The R-123M radio

The R-123 is used mainly in tanks and armoured vehicles or together with other radios in complete stations i.e Gaz 66/Zil 131 radio listening station 113.

with modern western sets, but rugged and reliable as well as being immune to EMP blasts.

The radio itself is very well made and uses valve technology. This set is still in service wherever the BRDM2 and other soviet vehicles are being used. Not very powerful compared



Angolan and Cuban troops on reconnaissance would use the radio fitted in the BRDM-2 armoured car in the background of which the antenna can clearly be seen

### Specifications

Country of Origin:	USSR/Russia
Weight (Complete):	N/A
Dimensions (l x w x h):	N/A
Transmitting Power:	20 W
Frequency Band:	20 MHz - 51.5 MHz Range 1: 20 — 37.75 MHz Range 2: 35.75—51.5 MHz
Sensitivity:	N/A
Range:	14 to 28 km ( miles)
Batteries:	BP-26

“It is rugged and reliable as well as being immune to EMP blasts”

### The R-123M Radio



Image from Trapper Industries ([www.trapperindustries.com](http://www.trapperindustries.com))



## Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Zhdarkin, Part 47



OP SCEPTIC: Soldiers buying cigarettes from the SAWI vehicle

"Sadly, out of all four, they found only the boot of that Angolan who had stood outside."

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OP SCEPTIC: A Buffel troop carrier has just detonated a landmine and in the foreground one of the survivors is assisted

This is the forty-seventh part of a 52-part series taken from "**We did not see it even in Afghanistan**. Memoirs of a participant of the Angolan war (1986-1988)", by Lieutenant Colonel Igor Anatolevich Zhdarkin

But, as they say, what we had warned about, turned out to be. We were sitting at home in the mission, apparently resting after dinner. Suddenly in the distance, in the direction of the brigade, there was a powerful explosion so that the ground shook under our feet. Ignatiev and I looked at each other, suddenly understanding everything, rushed into the car and drove off to the brigade. There it was explained to us that several Angolans were loading mines into a storage

places – in effect a large dugout. One Angolan stood in the very deep of the storehouse near some mines, while another was in the centre of the dugout, and a third stood at the entrance. A fourth provided the mines and stood outside. But they tossed the mines to each other as we had advised them against, namely as if they had been watermelons. Evidently, someone failed to catch it, and the storehouse was almost full... As a result, sadly, out of all four, they found only the boot of that Angolan who had stood outside.

– **What was the "punishment" of the operational section chief of the 21st brigade's for his betrayal?**

When we were already on the defence, covering Cuito-Cuanavale, (after all those reversals of fortune with the encirclement), and a new commander for the operational section was sent – unfortunately, I forgot his name. He was always very courteous with us Soviets, several times invited us to small celebrations on the occasion of this or that local anniversary, constantly consulted us on the most varied issues, demonstrated feverish activity and devotion to the "cause of the revolution".

On the other hand, from the time of his arrival, a number of our groups fell into the ambushes of UNITA and the South African army. And the South Africans began to hit our positions much

The South Africans hit us much more accurately than before

more accurately than before, as well as the command point of our brigade. On the whole, the impression arose that they were always relatively well informed about our movements and intentions. As a result it generally appeared that this comrade was simply a traitor who, on the sly, informed the enemy about everything possible. His «punishment» was severe. He was taken away from our brigade and sent to the rear, somewhat farther away from the front.

– **What was the situation when you handed over the coordinates of your 21st brigade, after which the South Afri-**

**cans began to hit you with greater precision?**

Being all the time on the move (on operations), we went from place to place and whenever we would occupy a fixed position, naturally, we would communicate our coordinates to the military district base. Of course, in the beginning this was done by the Angolans (the brigade command), but, apparently, they did this inaccurately because, during the bombardment by the South Africans, the shells fell inaccurately – many over flew the target or did not reach it. Our Mihalych was a very scrupulous man and he always took full responsibility for a situation. He

determined the coordinates and transmitted them precisely, in contrast to the Angolans. Evidently, in the district (Cuito-Cuanavale), within the Angolan command, there were traitors who, upon acquiring the coordinates, transmitted them to the enemy. Because our coordinates were more accurate, the result after we had transmitted them, the South Africans began to hit our brigade more accurately. Naturally, we discovered this very fast and Mikhalych raised this issue at various levels, several times, but no measures were taken.

*To be continued next week in Part 48...*

## Northern Angola: The South Africans withdraw from Ambriz

*The twelfth article about the conflict in Northern-Angola...*

With the collapse of the FNLA's front south of Ambriz, it was clear that the South Africans would not be able to make any further positive contributions to the war effort. The withdrawal of his men was a constant issue of concern to Brigadier Roos. With the Ambriz airport not safe due to the bad condition of the runway, he was looking for another point of departure and even considered just crossing the border into Zaire. He had promised the Americans at Ambriz that they could travel with them should the evacuation be done by cargo plane. The Americans, however, suddenly disappeared during the night of 24 and 25 November, putting aside the notion of possibly crossing the border into Zaire together. The last two American liaison officials departed on 28 November.

On 24 November the

Chief of the Army told Brigadier Roos that he had to decide on his own as to how he and his team would depart from Northern-Angola. Amongst other possibilities, Brigadier Roos considered leaving for Nova Lisboa on a light Fokker Friendship plane at first light on 27 November.

Unfortunately there were about fifty FNLA-members which had arrived at Ambriz from the south for discussions during the previous day, and they were looking for a plane to take them back. If they were left behind it would not create a good impression. Evacuation by ship also presented the same problem during daylight. It would have a negative impact on the morale of the troops that remained behind. It was then decided to evacuate from a different port, either Ambrizette or Santo António do Zaire.

Brigadier Roos was concerned that the enemy would be able to squash the allied forces at Am-

briz against the ocean and the impassable marshes to the north, and he brought that fact under Holden Roberto's attention. He recommended that Roberto destroy the bridges to the south and retreat with his remaining forces to the Carmona/Negage area. It was indeed Brigadier Roos's last recommendation to Roberto before he and his men left Ambriz on two Unimogs at 22h00 on 27 November 1975.

To ensure that the enemy would not be able to benefit from the guns if they managed to capture them, the primers were removed in secret and thrown into the ocean. Roberto had promised to take the guns to safety and they were indeed towed to Zaire from where they were returned to South Africa after the war on 14/15 March 1976.

*Next week: Pickup at Ambrizette...*



OP SCEPTIC: A Tiffy performing his magic

"The Americans suddenly disappeared during the night of 24 and 25 November"

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OP SCEPTIC: An unknown soldier catching up on lost sleep while travelling on a Buffel troop carrier

### CODE OF CONDUCT FOR AIR DEFENCE ARTILLERY SOLDIERS

I, as an air defence artillery gunner, take the following pledge to apply the rules associated to our motto "alta pete"...

ALWAYS NEAT  
LOYAL AND NEVER COMPLAIN  
TAKE SECURITY AND LOOSE TALK SERIOUSLY  
AN ASSET TO THE CORPS  
PROUD OF MY EQUIPMENT  
ENERGETIC  
TOUGH AND FIT  
ENTHUSIASTIC IN EXECUTING COMMANDS

... And to obey and apply the South African (National) Defence Force Code of Conduct and to uphold the customs and traditions of the air defence gunner.

Images with kind permission from "61 Mechanised Battalion Group Veterans Association", [www.61mech.org.za](http://www.61mech.org.za)

## Angolan Independence: Political background



OP SCEPTIC: The crew of an Eland 60 working on some plans

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<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=1325>

"War was a continuation of politics in a different form..."

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OP SCEPTIC: More 140 mm projectiles being prepared for action

*The first article in a series about the political and military decisions around 11 November 1975...*

It was an open question whether politics should be seen as a background to military activities in times of war, or vice versa. The quote of the well-known author Carl von Clausewitz, that war was a continuation of politics in a different form is probably still as true today as when he wrote it in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. (Compare "**The Sword and the Pen. Selections from the world's greatest military writings**", collected

by Sir Basil Liddell Hart and published by Adrian Liddell Hart, p. 151)

That does not imply that the general cannot also influence political decisions. There is interaction and collaboration. Every war has not only its military phase but also a political phase.

The political aspect, as far as Operation Savannah was concerned, came strongly to the fore around 11 November 1975. At that stage the initial military instruction had been accomplished. According to plan, all South African soldiers had to be withdrawn

from Angola on its Day of Independence (11 November 1975). By that time, however, the intended political goals had not been reached. The decision therefore had to be made to either continue fighting or withdraw. It was a political decision which had to be made in consultation with the military leaders.

Political decision-making lay with the Cabinet, the relevant ministers and the State Security Council. Military decision-making lay with a group of appointed people who met regularly around a conference table.

### Around the conference table...

In Pretoria a small group of experienced and pre-appointed persons gathered around a conference table on a weekly, and later on a daily basis, at a fixed time, to make decisions about the military actions in Angola. They were Maj.-Gen. C. Viljoen, the Director General of Operations for the Chief of Staff, assisted by Brigadier W. Black. The SA Army was represented by Lt.-Gen. M.A. de M. Malan, Chief of the Army, assisted by Brigadier J.J. Geldenhuys, his Director of Operations. The Chief of Staff Logistics representatives were Colonel N.J.G. Coetsee and Commandant Des Radmore, who was later replaced by Colonel E.W. Pope. The SA Air Force was represented by Lt.-Gen. R.H.D. Rogers, Chief of the Air Force, assisted by Brigadier P. Letley who was his Director of Opera-

tions, and later also by his Senior Staff Officer of Operations, Brigadier D.J. Earp. On 3 November 1975 the SA Navy was also drawn in and was eventually represented by Commodore W.D. Hogg, Director of Operations and Commodore G.N. Britz, the Commanding Officer of Navy Operations at Silvermine. Because Navy Headquarters was still based in Cape Town at that time, Commodore A.R. Dommissie was temporarily appointed as Staff Officer of Navy Operations in the personnel of the Chief of the SADF, who attended the meetings regularly.

Military Intelligence was represented by Lt.-Gen. H. de V. du Toit, Chief of Staff Intelligence, assisted by Colonel I.R. Gleeson and Commandant M. Knoetze, while the Bureau of State Security was also represented.

It was therefore this small group which, even with their regular workload, had to ensure the smooth conduct of Operation Savannah under the strictest secrecy. Of course, not all the named personnel were able to attend all the meetings all the time. Some of them simply had to travel between Angola, Rundu and Pretoria too often to organise matters.

When new strategies were planned, it was presented to the Minister of Defence for approval, upon which a decision was made whether to present it to the Cabinet of the State Security Council. Before the decisions around 11 November 1975 can be discussed though, attention needs to be paid to some of the factors influencing it.

*Next week: Political co-operation between the FNLA and UNITA...*

## Uittreksel uit "Ag man dit 'WAS' lekker in die Army" - van Danie Matthee

Omdat dit so bloedig warm op Katimo Malilo was het ons die middag, nadat ons van patrollie af gekom het, rustig verkeer deur net in ons *pt* broeke in ons tente rond te lê en niks doen nie. Meteens word die basis deur SWAPO

aangeval en 'n mortier bars deur ons tent dak en val tussen ons waar ons op ons beddens lê. Gelukkig vir ons was dit 'n *dud* en onploff die mortier nie maar ons skrik so groot dat ons skoon van ons gewere ver-geet en stamp mekaar

uit die pad om by die *bunkers* uit te kom. Daar lê ons in die *bunkers* net in ons *pt* broeke sonder enige vuurwapen terwyl die mortiere en koeëls oor ons koppe vlieg. Ons was nie juis van enige hulp gewees nie want wat kan 'n ou nou doen sonder 'n vuurwapen as daar op jou gevuur word. Ons het maar net daar in die bunkers ge-

wag totdat alles weer rustig was en terug gesluip om ons gewere te gaan haal sonder dat die ander ouens ons sien om 'n gespot te voorkom. Na die petalje het ek seker gemaak dat my vuurwapen altyd by my was soos ons in basies geleer is, want in sulke omstandighede sal dit jou niks baat om iemand met jou broekrek te probeer skiet nie!

Kannonier D Pretorius  
1979 tot 1980



## Battle Group 61's plan to capture Smokeshell

(Continued from page 2)

mine the road to Oshifitu. The rest of the battle group was to move to the Oshifitu area on D-2 and proceed with decoy area operations. On D-1 the entire battle group would move to Eenhana for replenishment which would have to be completed by 18h00 on D-1. At 19h00 on D-1 the movement to Mulemba would begin in order to occupy laager positions in marching order immediately north of Mulemba by 07h00 on D-day.

**Phase 2:** Deployment of stopper groups and movement to Assembly Area. By first light on D-day on command of the commander movement would commence in marching order from Mulemba over Mulavi to the Assembly Area. B Echelon and Combat Team 4, having disem-

barked from their vehicles, would stay at Mulemba. The vehicles from Combat Team 4 would move further by accompanying and leading the A Echelon. At first light, Combat Team 4 was to be reorganised into three groups, picked up by nine helicopters, and deployed as stopper groups north of Smokeshell on escape routes.

**Phase 3:** Attack on part of QFL. Simultaneous attacks by Combat Teams 1 and 2 supported by the artillery, mortars, and Combat Team 3's fire support as follows:

- Combat Team 1 was to capture the HQ complexes 6 and 7 while Combat Team 3 provided fire support and cut off through fire on the northern flank.

- Combat Team 2 was to capture the administrative area in complexes 8 to 11.

- Combat Team 3 was to provide fire support on the HQ complex in the area of complex 5.

- Combat Teams 4 and 5 were to provide cut off and stopper groups.

- Combat Team 6 would remain in reserve.

**Phase 4:** Final capture of Smokeshell. Three combat teams would attack as follows:

- Combat Team 1: to capture the living quarters in complexes 2, 3 and 4.

- Combat Team 2: to capture the forward posts in complexes 12 and 13.

(Continued on page 8)

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"Simultaneous attacks by Combat Teams 1 and 2..."



OP SCEPTIC: Ratels on a bridge

## Operation Carrot 1979: The June infiltrations



OP SCEPTIC: Two soldiers in the echelon in front of a Magirus Deutz truck

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"A herdsman had entertained him at his home while his son went for help."

During June 1979 the fourth confirmed infiltration by SWAPO occurred. The strength of the group was estimated to be 24 with a possibility of another 8 members.

On 5 June the tracks of the group were spotted and contact was made with 12 of the group on the farm Oerwoud. After this the group broke up into smaller groups of twos and threes and ex-filtrated. One was killed during ex-filtration on 6 June and on 7 June another one, Nestory Metrus, was killed at Last Hope. L/Cpl H. Swart was also killed in one of the contacts.

The second group of 12 also broke up. Six ex-filtrated while 5 or 6 managed to infiltrate past Tsumeb. At Arbeidsgenot one was

killed on 13 June and another one of the group was killed in a contact on the farm Rentes.

On 15 June Lukas Shinigua, was killed in the Okapwa district (near Otavi) after an army patrol spotted the group clambering over a fence wire. On 3 July another one was killed at Kaieberg by Cpl. Walton of 1 SAI. A herdsman had entertained him at his home while his son went for help. He deliberately played his radio louder to prevent the terrorist from hearing the security forces approach. After this the rest disappeared.

The tracks of a different group of 8 which crossed the Magnetti cut-line were followed on 5 June. Contact was not made with this group and it

was possible that they were responsible for the sabotage north of Kombat on 3 July.

### **Infiltration in the west:**

On 23 June two terrorists moving northwest were discovered on the farm Kamatanga. Both were killed at Omalinda. They were responsible for a hand grenade incident at Jagerhef on 16 June and were probably still part of the remaining *Filengemo* group. During this contact a member of the SA Police, Piesang Pretorius, was wounded in the head.

No confirmation could be found of any infiltration through western Owambo into the Kamanjab area during 1979. It is also not impossible that such infiltration could have taken place.

## Battle Group 61's plan to capture Smokeshell

(Continued from page 7)

- Combat Team 3: to capture complexes 1 and 5.
- Combat Teams 4 and 5: to provide stopper groups.
- Reserve Combat Team 6: to start clearing up the HQ complexes 6 and 7.

**Phase 5:** Clearing up and preparation to occupy laagers. During daylight clearing up should take place. Before last light combat teams would join the stopper groups.

**Phase 6:** Clearing up of Smokeshell and attack on londe. On D+1 Com-

bat Teams 1 and 3 would move to londe by the northern route, and were to be supported by the Artillery Battery. The rest of the Battle Group would continue clearing up Smokeshell and performing area operations.

**Phase 7:** Area operations to be done as follows:

- Combat Team 1: londe and to its south
- Combat Team 2: from Cafima to Smokeshell
- Combat Team 3: patrolling from north to west
- Combat Team 4: patrolling southwest of Smokeshell

- Combat Team 5: patrolling north of Smokeshell

- Combat Team 6: prepare to damage landing strip at londe

**Phase 8:** Withdrawal. On command each combat team will group in their respective areas. Combat Team 5 would transmit its location so that the Echelon could pick up ±90 troops for the withdrawal. The withdrawal movement would occur on command.

*Next week: The operation starts, including a MAP of Smokeshell...*



OP SCEPTIC: Commanders of 61 Mech Bn Gp during the operation

## This past week: "Somewhere on the Border..."

In **June 1967**, the MPLA declared that they already have 3 000 people under their control in eastern Angola.

Renewed fighting erupted in Luanda on **5 June 1975**.

On **7 June 1975**, the renewed fighting in Luanda was halted again by yet another ceasefire agreement.

On **6 June 1977**, the protective platoon of 32 Bn at Omauni was sent with nine vehicles to drop two additional platoons at Beacon 29 and re-supply those deployed in the Yati Strip.

The 32 Bn convoy of nine vehicles from Omauni was ambushed by SWAPO on **7 June 1977**, and they managed to damage two vehicles,

both of which were recovered after SWAPO fled from a counter attack by another 32 Bn platoon which was patrolling nearby.

Two 32 Bn patrols became involved in a skirmish with one another on **7 June 1977**, resulting in only light casualties.

On **3 June 1979**, 3 Squadron, SAAF, returned to AFB Ondangwa to escort Impalas on a strike against a SWAPO target near Humbe.

The SWAPO leadership held a conference at Ongiva on **5 June 1980** to consider alternative tactics for a renewed offensive during the coming rainy season.

On **7 June 1980**, Operation Sceptic started with

air attacks by the SAAF on QFL and the main SWAPO headquarters at Lubango.

Brigadier Joubert used a Puma to visit UNITA troops in Angola on **1 and 2 June 1983**, just north of beacons 16 to 18.

On **6 June 1983**, a 60-man force from the Reconnaissance Regiment was transported to Eenhana in preparation of Operation Neptune.

Two Puma helicopters shuttled the 60 Recce Commando troops from Eenhana to an LZ near Mulemba for Operation Neptune on **7 June 1983**.


FAPLA's 1986 offensive started in **June 1986** as eleven FAPLA brigades deployed around Luena

and Cazombo pushed south, and eight more brigades advanced east from Cuito Cuanavale.

On **5 June 1986**, SA Special Forces destroyed two oil tanks and sank a Cuban cargo ship in Namibe harbour, and also damaged two Soviet freighters and another oil tank.

FAPLA forces began its advance on Mavimga on **2 Jun 1987**.

On **2 June 1988**, the SAAF initiated Operation Assassin, a programme of EW electronics intelligence flights covering the southern Angolan coast and the railway line between Namibe and Lubango, paying particular attention to the area between Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale.



### TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SADF AND SWATF!

Write the names of the units represented by the flashes below each one.

*Find the answers in*

### Last week's unit flashes:



**Western Cape Command Provost Unit** was formed in 1977 from the Military Police

Detachment based in Cape Town. It provided both military police and operational support to the SA Army Western Cape Command and comprised of Citizen Force elements. The badge incorporates Table Mountain. In 1999, this unit ceased operations in its previous establishment, and re-opened as an MP Area Office of the SANDF MPA.



**The Air Defence Artillery School** can trace its origins to the first formal training

Institution, the Anti-Aircraft Training and Reserve Depot on Robben Island in 1941 but the current ADA School was established at Young's Field in 1955 as the Anti-Aircraft Training Centre. In 1968 it was replaced by the Artillery Air Defence School and 10 Anti-Aircraft Regiment, which one year later combined as one unit.



**The SA Army Gymnasium** was established around 1952 at Heidelberg as a train-

ing institution for junior leaders. In its original form it was to train officers and NCOs for all three services. In 1973, the task of training the Army's leader group was transferred to the Infantry School. The role of the Army Gymnasium changed to communications training with the arrival of the School of Signals and 1 Signal Regiment.

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OP SCEPTIC: The Op Sceptic convoy (Photo: Brian Dyason)

## Schedule of Events

- 8-10 June 2012 — Southport Funfest, UK
- 9 June 2012 — Classic Vehicle Rally, UK
- 9-10 June 2012 — MVT SOUTH EAST MIDLANDS AREA - WICKSTEED AT WAR, UK
- 9-10 June 2012 — St. Albans Steam and Country Show, UK
- 9-10 June 2012 — Battle of Britain Living History Show, UK
- 9-10 June 2012 — MVT SEVERNSIDE AREA - ANNUAL SHOW, UK
- 9-11 June 2012 — The Australian Model Expo 2012.
- 14 June 2012 — SA Military History Society Johannesburg: The work of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission; and The Art of War ; Lt.Col. J.N. Crealock's Anglo-Zulu War watercolours – then and now
- 14 June 2012 — SA Military History Society Durban: Heritage and Environmental Assessments; and Maj Gen Sir Charles Warren in Northern Natal
- 15-17 June 2012 — Barry Wartime Weekend, UK

## JUNE 2012

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10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

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


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
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THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989

The War In Angola  
34 Glen Oak Rd  
Welcome Glen  
Simons Town 7995 South  
Africa

Phone: +27 (0)72 409-6271  
Fax: 086 626-3388 (SA only)  
E-mail: info@warinangola.com

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The War In Angola website ([www.warinangola.com](http://www.warinangola.com)) is dedicated to recreating and re-fighting the battles between the adversaries of the Angolan War (or Border War as it is also known), that is, the SADF and UNITA on the one side and the Soviet-supplied FAPLA, Cuba, and SWAPO on the other side. In order to recreate the battles as accurate as possible, a lot of research is required about the equipment, organisation, quality, uniforms, command, support and logistical structures behind the different forces.

There are two sides to the website: the gaming and recreation of the miniature battles; and the historical facts and research of the forces behind the battles.

The dividing line between the two sides is deliberately blurred in order to expose both sides to all the users, thereby promoting and exposing the wargaming and modeling hobby to the historically inclined and vice-versa.

Johan Schoeman

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## Last week's latest topics on the Forums

Link to the Forums:

<http://www.warinangola.com/Default.aspx?tabid=590>

### RE: Stellaland Commando by johansamin

This was very interesting,  
Thanks, Dick!...

### RE: Stellaland Commando by dickand-jill@melliferahunts.co.za

Stellaland Commando culminates their 107 years of history with Vryburg.

A 300 year history is drawing to a close in the Republic of South Africa with the final closure of the l...

### Eheke by lulupaxt

Interested in any one that was at Eheke in 1987, contact me on lulupaxt@bigpond.net.au. Thankyou...

### Eheke by lulupaxt

Interested in any one that was there in 1987, contact me on lulupaxt@bigpond.net.au. Thankyou...

### RE: James Gibson by James Gibson

Unit History Year 1979

My 90 days on the Border in 1979 was pretty much the same as in 1978. Reference Unit History 1978

We were quite active in the Sector 10 Operational area, ...

### RE: Koevoet Casualty Information by Judge

Mark thanks for feeling my frustration and pain. I will dig some further and if need be - will drop you a line on that supplied mail address. Thanks and appreciated. Richard...

### RE: Koevoet Casualty Information by Markn

I was also denied even though I was also an ex SAP. If you don't have any success then let me know and I will see if i can help. I have an incredible amount of info on Koevoet and will go through it...

### RE: Koevoet Casualty Information by Judge

Mark. I was in touch with Pine himself who referred me across to the web page. Unfortunately, although I served my country for 13 years wearing a blue uniform I was dissapointed to find that I was not...

### RE: Koevoet Casualty Information by Markn

Hi there.

You can try either the koevoet website or the koevoet facebook page. The contact person will be Pine Pienaar, who administers both....

### RE: neels barnard by barriers

Ek het in 1987 ingeklaar in 2 Spesiale Diens Batteljon in Zeerust en eers in 1989 Maart maand uitgeklaar. Ek het 68 ekstra dae gedoen. Ek was ook een van 2SDB se top boksters gewees al sien ek dat dit ...